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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND
COST CONTAINMENT:
TIGHTENING THE SCREWS
Barry R. Furrow*
Professor Furrow analyzes the interaction of health care cost containment with
tort doctrine and the tortprocess. He demonstrates that both tort law and medical
decisionmaking have always implicitly recognized cost considerations. He examines
this history as it now applies in the current explicitly cost-conscious mileau.
Prohibitive cost constraints as a defense to medical malpractice liability is rejected. Professor Furrow concludes thatfocusing attention on the institutionalprovider ratherthan the individualpractitioneris a healthy trend in light ofthe growing
centrality of the institution in regulatingthe availability of health care services and
technology and in establishing health carestandardsfor its practitioners. Finally,he
notes that reduced intervention through involving the patient in the decisionmaking
process and through resistingthe urge to act affirmatively in the face of uncertainty
can not only reduceprimarycosts, it can also reduce the unnecessary secondary costs,
both economic andsocial, of medical iatrogenesis Tort law can encouragegrowth in
this direction through encouragingprofessionalintrospection and establishingappropriate, cost-sensitive standardsof care

INTRODUCTION
Even in the corpus of such a scientifically based profession as
medicine one finds a heart of solid skill surrounded by a large
fatty mass of unexamined practices uncritically honored because
of their association with the core skills . **

SENSITIVITY TO COST has increasingly dominated the practice
of medicine and the delivery of health care in the decade and a
half since Friedson wrote of the "large fatty mass of unexamined
practices." American hospitals and physicians are struggling to
contain the escalating costs of medical care in the face of pressure

from Medicare payment reforms, corporate and insurer demands,
and the market.' Payment for services rendered on a retrospective
basis, with no questions asked, is a closed chapter in history for
*

Professor of Law and Director of the Health Law Center, University of Detroit

School of Law. B.A., Harvard College (1967); .D., Harvard Law School (1971).
The author gratefully acknowledges the comments and suggestions of Robert Brown and
the insightful critique of E. Haavi Morreim, the commentator on this Article.
** E. FRIEDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE 181 (1970).
1. See Herzling & Schwartz, How Companies Tackle Health Care Costs: Part I, 63
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hospitals treating Medicare patients;2 physician services are next on
the regulatory agenda.
The chapter closed for hospitals in 1983 when Congress adopted
the diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) program. This DRG system
was designed to provide incentives for cost containment by creating
an administered price system under which hospitals are paid a predetermined price for services based upon an average cost calculation
for a patient with a particular diagnosis. Hospitals can no longer
charge what they want, nor even charge based on their cost. The
DRG payment structure prescribes the limits.
This contrasts sharply with the previous fee-for-service system
under which the hospital billed the federal government for the actual charges incurred and was paid with little risk of challenge.
With no incentive to control costs, the health care bill grew to a
significant percentage of the Gross National Product. DRGs strive
to slow or halt this inflationary trend. Hospitals must now be
"DRG-efficient in providing services" with real costs kept lower
than DRG rates in order to generate surplus for equipment acquisition, salary increases, and service improvement. 3
The Medicare DRG system, in Lester Thurow's words, is likely
to be "the ripple that will build into the wave of the future."4 Several states have adopted the DRG model for their Medicaid programs. Even a few private insurers have adopted some version of
the DRG model to control their reimbursement costs. Thurow
predicts that this trend will ultimately result in a capitation payment system.' Institutional structures such as health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) already operate on a capitation basis, linking
the financial solvency of the organization to the ability of the doctor
to limit costs.
HARV. Bus. REV. 69 (1985); Herzlinger, How Companies Tackle Health CareCosts: PartII,
63 HARV. Bus. REV. 108 (1985).
2. The hospital industry has done surprisingly well to date under prospective payment.
The 1984 financial results for all 5,000 American hospitals show that surplus revenue more
than doubled, with the large urban and suburban hospitals thriving. Only the small rural
hospitals and the public hospitals have suffered, since they treat large numbers of the uninsured or underinsured poor. Waldholz, Most Hospitals Quickly Learn to Be Profitable,Wall
St. J., Aug. 28, 1985, at 6. See also PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION,
MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM:

RE-

PORT TO THE CONGRESS 52 (Feb. 1986) (noting the enhanced profitability and liquidity experienced by hospitals).
3. See Dolenc & Dougherty, DRGs: The Counterrevolutionin FinancingHealth Care,
15 HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1985, at 19.
4. Thurow, Medicine versus Economics, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 611, 612 (1985).
5. Id. at 613.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

The institution, whether hospital, HMO, or other form, has no
direct authority to tell a doctor how to practice medicine. The institution can only decide which facilities to provide (neonatal intensive
care units, burn centers, etc.), limit physician access to certain
equipment and services (closed radiology staffs), and set general
rules. Yet, while the doctor's treatment decisions remain his own,
the indirect pressures can be as powerful as an explicit set of rules
for diagnostic and treatment choices, given the extent of institutional control over staff positions.
Doctors feel these cost-containment pressures most strongly,
since they are the gatekeepers to health care.6 The new economic
environment is blurring the line between pure medical decisions and
business decisions. As Starr asks, "[W]hen both medical and economic considerations are relevant, which will prevail and who will
decide?" 7
These institutional pressures and the increasing use of prospective payment systems have generated worry among physicians.
They fear loss of autonomy as economic values are substituted for
medical values, and they worry about rationing of medical resources in unfair ways. There is a concern that medical decisionmaking will be pressured toward reducing patient utilization of
drugs, diagnostic tests, and hospital services at the expense of the
quality of care, with particularly pernicious effects on the poor.8 Finally, they are concerned about the possible ramifications the cost6. Fuchs writes:
His role is particularly important with respect to the cost of care, for his are usually
the pivotal decisions concerning hospitalization, surgery, tests and drugs. Given the
uncertainties about the effect of medical care on health, there is frequently a wide
range of choice open to the physician on these matters. It follows that a concern
with cost requires concentrating on the physician... most important, the incentives
and constraints that he faces once he has set up practice.
V. FucHs, WHO SHALL LIVE?: HEALTH, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIAL CHOICE 145 (1974)
(emphasis in original). Nearly a decade later, Paul Starr notes the loss in physician control
and autonomy in the face of the "coming of the corporation." Doctors still remain the gatekeepers, however. Starr writes:
Profit-making hospitals require doctors to generate admissions and revenues; prepaid health plans, while having the opposite incentives, still require doctors' cooperation to control hospital admissions and overall costs. Because of their dependence
on physicians, the corporations will be generous in granting awards, including more
autonomy than they give to most other workers.
P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE
7. P. STARR, supra note 6, at 447.

446 (1982).

8. The worries are voiced by both the media and lawyers who represent the poor. See
Grady, The Cruel Price of Cutting Medical Expenses, 7 DISCOVER, May 1986, at 25;
Perkinds, The Effects of Health Care Cost Containment on the Poor: An Overview, 19
CLEARINGHOUSE REV.831 (1985).
Other fears, such as turning patients into "products" or decreasing variety in health care
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containment movement may have on their exposure to tort liability.
Doctors fear that they will be caught between the Scylla of cost
containment and the Charybdis of tort liability.
This Article explores the malpractice implications of the movement toward prospective payment and cost containment. It considers the likely effects of tort doctrine and process on cost-constrained
medical decisions. It argues that since the threat of malpractice litigation is one of the incentives which affects medical practice, tort
doctrine should be refined to explicitly deal with cost-effective medical decisions. That is, tort suits should operate to create more powerful incentives for institutions, such as hospitals, to scrutinize staff
behavior and enhance peer review, focusing doctrinal change more
on the institution than on the individual doctor. It concludes that
bedside cost constraints should not be allowed as a defense in a tort
suit when a doctor decides that a particular patient should forgo a
treatment or test that would have been prescribed if the patient had
been insured or had greater private resources.
I.

COST CONSTRAINTS AND INCENTIVE BUNDLES

A.

The Medical PracticeSetting

The new prospective payment system and new institutional
providers create powerful cost constraint pressures which affect the
practice of medicine. These pressures are consciously perceived by
doctors during the current zone of transition from the expansive
style of practice common to most medical settings to a more constrained style. Cost sensitivity will ultimately be internalized, eventually representing the norm of practice.
These norms are being shaped in bureaucratic settings, typically
the hospital. Sociologists and economists share the belief that an
individual's behavior responds more to his environment than to his
personal characteristics, that the medical setting is more important
than past training and values in shaping physician behavior.9 Thus,
the institutional setting will prove critical in this transition phase,
and the incentives that affect practice in these bureaucratic settings
include both the threat of malpractice litigation and peer pressure.
delivery, are not treated in this Article. For a good discussion, see Dolenc & Dougherty,
supra note 3.
9. See E. FRIEDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF
APPLIED KNOWLEDGE 90 (1970). For a more recent confirmatory study, see Rhee, Relative
Importance of Physicians' Personaland Situational Characteristicsfor the Quality of Patient
Care, 18 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 10 (1977).
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As to the latter, Friedson noted that colleague control is superceding client control over medical practice in an environment where
the solo practitioner is being supplanted by group practice and hospital staff appointments. Consistently with Friedson, sociologists
have hypothesized that "the more colleague dependent the practice
setting, the more likely there will be self-imposed peer review.
Thus, the odds for the provision of higher quality medical care are
enhanced in colleague-dependent practices." 10
The interaction between the pressure to contain costs and the
two institutional incentives encouraging quality care (malpractice
suits and peer pressure) seem to create an insoluble tension. In fact,
however, the two forces can work together, resulting in both reduced health care costs and reduced levels of medical iatrogenesis
due to diagnosis and treatment. Cost-constraint forces and the
threat of liability must first be unbundled and the components examined separately. These incentives can then be reassembled, so
that malpractice doctrine works as it should-as a quality control
mechanism, a positive force toward both good and cost-effective
medical practice.
B.

The Nature of "Cost Constraints"

A cost constraint, as it is coming to operate within the institutional delivery of health care, can be defined as a source of pressure
upon clinical decisionmaking through hospital rules or monitoring
systems which tie physician salary, staff privileges, or other benefits
to effective control of costs. Thus, a salaried doctor's income in a
HMO depends upon the end of the year bottom line revenues. In a
hospital, salary may be affected through incentive plans; or staff
privileges may be revoked, or a reappointment denied, in an extreme case of cost overrun. 1
Medical staff incentive compensation plans are designed by hospitals to affect physician treatment decisions indirectly, typically by
10. F.

WOLINSKY & W. MARDER, THE ORGANIZATION OF MEDICAL PRACTICE AND

THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 24 (1985).

11. For a recent decision upholding a hospital's denial of a staff physician's reappointment, see Knapp v. Palos Community Hosp., 125 Ill. App. 3d 244, 465 N.E.2d 554 (1984).
The inquiry concentrated on the doctor's excessive use of lung scans, medications, tests, pacemakers, and pulmonary angiograms. However, the doctor's peers also offered evidence that
his excessive testing resulted in 30% higher costs.
Other cases involve internal or external utilization review, where the doctor is found to
have failed to meet professional standards. See, eg., Avol v. Hawthorne Community Hosp.,
184 Cal. Rptr. 914 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Suckle v. Madison Gen. Hosp., 362 F. Supp. 1196
(W.D. Wis. 1973).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:985

setting certain target levels of volume of care per patient. A doctor
is rewarded if he provides good quality care without exceeding the
standard. He may pay a penalty, or simply be admonished or put
on a list, if he exceeds the limits.12 The reimbursement system and
market forces thus shape these institutional pressures, creating both
the risk of rationing and anxiety at the level of clinical decisionmaking. These incentives also translate into peer pressure as doctors internalize the values of the institution and its goals.
Doctors are anxious about these explicit cost-sensitive pressures,
as if they were something new to medical practice. On the contrary,
economic incentives have always had an impact on physician behavior.1 3 Different modes of payment merely alter the balance of incentives upon doctors. One recent study, for example, concluded

that the use of high profit, high cost tests is higher in large fee-forservice groups than in large prepaid groups.

4

The risk of rationing, although the most serious, is not the only
component of the problem under a DRG system. 5 Cost incentives
may also lead to an artificial imbalance in the utilization of procedures, leading to overuse of some and underuse of others.
Cost reduction matters most to the staff doctor, since his or her
salary and status now become more directly linked to the excess of
revenues over costs. Hospitals therefore want physicians, as the
gatekeepers, caretakers, and prescribers of drugs, to reduce costs
and thereby increase profits for the institution. Hospitals have even
hired consultants to ensure that patients are placed in DRG catego12. See Weissburg & Stem, Can HospitalsReward PhysiciansFor Reducing Unnecessary
Utilization?, FED. AM. Hosp. REV. 45, Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 45. The authors note, "Some
systems are so complex that they utilize sophisticated computer programs which analyze past
performance and the severity of illness of individual patients, while others merely reward a
physician if the hospital's costs for a specific patient are less than the DRG payment." Id
See also Morreim, The MD and the DRG, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1985, at 30.
13. See Luft, Economic Incentives and Clinical Decisions, in THE NEW HEALTH CARE
FOR PROFIT: DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT 102 (B. Gray

ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as THE NEW HEALTH CARE]; Egdahl & Taft, FinancialIncentives to Physicians,315 NEw ENG. J. MED. 59 (1986).
14. Epstein, Begg & McNeil, The Use of Ambulatory Testing in Prepaid and Fee-ForService Group Practices, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1089 (1986).
15. Only under a pure capitation system will the problem of rationing be the main
theme. A recent study concludes that 90% of medical and surgical admissions fall into DRG
categories for which admission rates are extremely variable. Professional discretion, therefore, plays an important role in determining hospitalization. As a result, hospitals have incentives encouraging doctors to improve the case mix by shifting patients into more profitable
DRGs. A shift to more lucrative practice styles will result, feeding inflation. See Wennberg,
McPherson & Caper, Will Payment Based on Diagnosis-Related Groups Control Hospital
Costs?, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 295 (1984).
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ries that reimburse above cost, and have encouraged doctors to diThey have also
agnose patients in these higher-paying DRGs.
16
encouraged fewer tests and early discharge.
C. The Threat of Malpractice
A view of the malpractice suit as an isolated and tragic event in
a doctor's life is myopic; litigation generates broader ripples on the
sea of medical practice. Tort law is generally viewed as an economic/behavioral mechanism. A rule of liability can substitute for
regulation of the quality of medical care. It provides health care
practitioners with incentives to reduce injury and medical error,
since patients lack the information to monitor the quality of care
themselves. The existence of a liability rule and the resulting threat
of a lawsuit affect behavior. Anticipation of liability propels potential defendants into taking further safety precautions and buying insurance. The economic model of liability seeks an optimal
prevention policy, one which "minimizes the total cost associated
with injuries, including the resource and utility costs of injuries
themselves, the costs of prevention, and the administrative costs of
effecting compensation." 17
The limitations on the model are substantial, given the effects of
insurance and information deficiencies in realistically assessing the
risks of being sued. However, one can argue that a lawsuit and a
potential judgment have some incentive effect on medical practice,
although far from optimal under the economic model. In a variety
of ways, the effects of the threat of malpractice suits are apparent in
medical practice-in the growth of risk management offices and
quality assurance, in changes in informed consent practices, and in
recordkeeping. Danzon speculates:
[I]t is not implausible that the current non-trivial incidence of
injury due to negligence would be at least ten percent higher,
were it not for the incentives for injury prevention, created by the
one in ten incidents of malpractice that result in a claim. If so,
16. See Waldholz, supra note 2; Spivey, The Relation Between Hospital Management
andMedical Staff Under a Prospective-PaymentSystem, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 984 (1984).

17. P. DANzON,

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY

10 (1985) [hereinafter cited as MEDICAL MALPRACTICE]. Calabresi writes that "the principal function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of
avoiding accidents .... This cost, or loss, reduction goal can be divided into three subgoals .... The first is reduction of the number and severity of accidents." G. CALABRESI,
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26 (1970). See also Schwartz & Komesar, Doctors,Damages and
Deterrence"An Economic View ofMedicalMalpractice,298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1282 (1978);
THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (S.Rottenberg ed. 1978); Danzon, An Economic Analysis of the Medical MalpracticeSystem, 1 BEHAVIORAL SC. & L. 39 (1983).
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the malpractice system, despite its costs, is worth retaining."8

The threat of a tort suit is one force in the bundle of incentives
affecting medical practice, reducing the adverse effects of medical
misadventures. Salary, patient mix, and the practice setting also
provide incentives which shape medical behavior. The threat of a
malpractice suit may not operate as directly as the daily pressures
and the salary incentives, but it is part of the incentive bundle, and
its impact cannot be denied.
The current standards of medical diagnosis and treatment may
lead to excessive costs in terms of diagnostic errors, treatment side
effects, and drug-related harms. Less may be more in terms of positive patient outcomes, as well as cost reduction. Current reforms of
the health care system have focused primarily on cost containment,
but quality of care may benefit from the same reforms as well. Malpractice insurance, with its current pricing practices and lack of experience-rating, hardly distinguishes among risk levels in health
care providers. But the anxiety effect linked to uncertainty in litigation does have a significant, if imprecisely calibrated, effect.
D. Bundling Cost Constraints and Tort Litigation Together:
A First Step
The costs of medical error will be borne by health care providers
even if a lawsuit never materializes. The risk of suit is far lower
than might be predicted in the universe of medical injuries. Only
one of ten incidents of patient injury due to negligent behavior results in a claim, and only a fraction of those claims result in any
recovery. 19 However, other incentives prompt hospitals to consider
the costs of error and adverse impacts. Consider the "cascade effect," in which a small medical error cascades into larger, and expensive, complications.2"
Reimbursement schemes, whether DRGs or capitation within
18. Danzon, An Economic Analysis of the MedicalMalpractice System, I BEHAVIORAL
ScI. & L. 39 (1983). See generally Schwartz & Komesar, supra note 17. For a study of the
effect of informed consent litigation, see Novack, Plumer, Smith, Ochitill, Morrow & Bennett, Changes in Physicians'Attitudes Toward Telling the CancerPatient, 241 J. A.M.A. 897,
898 (1979) (noting that in 1961, 12% of surveyed doctors generally told a patient about a
cancer diagnosis, and by 1977, 98% had a general policy of informing the patient). For a
more pessimistic appraisal of the effects of informed consent doctrine in the psychiatric setting, see C.W. LlDz, A. MEISEL, E. ZERUBAVEL, M. CARTER, R.M. SESTAK & L.H. ROTH,
INFORMED CONSENT:

A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING IN PSYCHIATRY (1984).

19. See Danzon, supra note 18, at 42.
20. Robin writes, "As disease becomes more severe, the range and intensity of treatment
increases, leading to a greater possibility of iatrogenic episodes." E. ROBIN, MATTERS OF
LIFE & DEATH: RISKS VS. BENEFITS OF MEDICAL CARE 59 (1984).
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HMOs, will have a powerful incentive effect on these error costs.
Under fee-for-service medicine, neither hospitals nor physicians
viewed risk reduction as economically necessary, in the sense of absorbing the added costs of medical error. Assume a patient suffers
an adverse side effect from a surgical procedure. The complications, including further treatment and extended hospitalization, are
expensive. Under cost-based reimbursement, the hospital will, in
effect, be rewarded with increased reimbursement from the government or a third-party payor.
Prospective payment produces very different incentives; payment related to a particular diagnosis is fixed at a predetermined
level, with no possibility of reimbursement above that level. The
hospital, in effect, bears the costs of failure or error. The cost incenfives, therefore, encourage the hospital toward increased efficiency
by reducing medical error. While it is possible that medical care
could suffer in this situation, improved medical care may also
21
result.
The temptations of an institution to dump a patient when a cascade effect occurs and expenses mount must somehow be counterbalanced. The threat of a malpractice suit can provide the needed
incentive for hospitals to internalize their error costs, rather than
dumping patients who experience unexpected side effects which
may prolong their treatment. A variety of tort doctrines, such as
the tort duty of nonabandoment, coupled with the emerging "loss
of a chance" rule of causation, provide doctrinal flexibility.2 2 In
this way, the threat of a tort suit will force the institution to internalize the costs of error, even if the chances of a malpractice suit for
the original errors are statistically slight.
Most commentators have concluded that the pressures of cost
containment will cause standards of practice to shift downward, reflecting a diminished intensity of resource use. The tort system,
viewed as a mirror of this standard of practice, will simply reflect
this downward shift. A doctor will therefore be at no more risk for
suit after prospective payment than she was before.2" It is only the
transition that worries most doctors and commentators, since the
21. See Schumacher, Prospective Payment and the Resurgence of Quality, QUALITY
REV. BULL, Oct. 1984, at 298.
22. See infra notes 124-29, 154-57 and accompanying text.
23. See Kapp, Legaland EthicalImplicationsofHealth CareReimbursementby Diagnosis Related Groups, 12 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 245, 250 (1984) (with the shift downward in the standard of practice, mirrored by the tort standard, "[r]ationing would become

not an excuse, but an integral part of the caregiver's obligations").
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risk of liability exists only during this zone of transition between
practice levels. This is too simplistic a view of the effects of cost
containment. Tort law is not simply a mirror reflecting prevailing
medical practice; as will be seen, it can affirmatively affect medical
practice.
II.

MEDICAL PRACTICE: SOURCES OF IATROGENIC COSTS

The initial panic induced in physicians and hospitals by prospective payment is understandable; a changing working environment is
unpredictable, at least until the transition is complete and the doctor understands and adjusts to the new operating framework. The
doctor worries that any cost-sensitive decision-reducing diagnostic
testing, choosing a less expensive treatment, or releasing a patient
"early"-will expose him or her to liability.
These worries are overly simplistic, assuming an ideal medical
environment which does not currently exist. There is no standard
protocol for diagnosis and treatment of a given illness; much of
medical practice is full of uncertainty and subject to substantial variation. Similarly, there is no immutable tort standard "set" by outsiders to the profession. The standard is a professional one which
tolerates a wide range of acceptable approaches and normally mirrors standard practice. Finally, medical care is neither uniformly
available to all nor consistently rendered to those who do have access. Substantial variation in medical practice exists at several different levels, incorporating different medical practice styles,
different client groups, and different sources of reimbursement for
medical services.2 4
A realistic appraisal of the effects and constructive function of
malpractice litigation requires a look at the costs of medical intervention. Malpractice suits are one useful source of incentives,
among the bundle of incentives shaping medical practice, and they
need to work in tandem with cost pressures to achieve quality, lowcost health care services.
A.

The Cost of Intervention

The problem of the doctor and costs, in terms of the spectre of
malpractice, is a subset of the larger question of what constitutes
good medical practice. If good medical practice is doing all that is
24. Thurow has identified three levels of care: government-paid care for the poor and
the elderly; fixed price contract care between health care providers and corporations; and free
market individual care, covered by private insurance. See Thurow, supra note 4, at 613.
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technologically possible, without resource contraints, then the inverse is arguably malpractice. Physicians have voiced concern
along these lines, citing a variety of ethical norms impelling the doctor to do all that is within his power to help the patient, regardless
25
of cost.
Medical ethicists have talked of the special duties of the doctor
in his relationship to the patient, characterizing the doctor as a
"special friend"2 6 with a "sacred trust." Hans Jonas describes this
duty as an obligation to ignore social and other concerns which interfere with the care of the specific patient.2 7
The practice of medicine is considerably more complicated than
the abstract statements of the ethical model. In many situations,
the doctor as "special friend" might well conclude that he should
resist a futile desire to continue to treat when further intervention
would be useless.2" Even the extreme statement of the duty-that
the doctor should let nothing interfere with the patient's interest "in
being cured" 29 - suggests the natural limits on such a duty. The
uncertainty in much medical practice, the substantial practice variation, and the tendencies toward intervention when in doubt lead us
toward a need to set limits when the possibility of "cure" is uncertain and the cost of intervention to both the patient and society is
substantial. The ethical model operates at the level of clinical decisionmaking, where each patient has a problem in need of a solution.
The incentives approach, on the other hand, redirects the ethicist to
consider the system-wide costs and benefits. The ethical-medical
model and the incentives model need not conflict, once consensus is
25. The Ethical Code of the World Health Association states: "A Doctor owes a patient... all the resources of his science." See also Levinsky, The Doctor'sMaster, 311 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1573 (1984).
26. Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The MoralFoundationsof the Laywer-Client Relation,
85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
27. He writes:
In the course of treatment, the physician is obligated to the patient and no one else.
He is not the agent of society, nor of the interests of medical science, nor of the
patient's family, nor of his co-sufferers, or future sufferers from the same disease.
The patient alone counts when he is under the physician's care .... The physician
is bound not to let any other interest interfere with that of the patient in being
cured. But manifestly more sublime norms than contractual ones are involved. We
may speak of a sacred trust; strictly by its terms, the doctor is, as it were, alone with
his patient and God.
Jonas, PhilosophicalReflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects, in CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN BioETHIcs 411, 417 (T. Beauchamp & L. Walters eds. 1978).
28. It has been argued that no classical duty to prolong life can be found in medical
ethics. See Amundsen, The Physician'sObligation to ProlongLife: A MedicalDuty Without
Classical Roots, 23 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 8, Aug. 1978, at 8.
29. See Jonas, supra note 27.
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achieved with respect to the relative importance of various social
goals.
The costs of medical intervention are high, not only in terms of
the dollars spent on the equipment and personnel utilized in treatment, but also in terms of the iatrogenic, or doctor-induced, patient
injuries resulting from much treatment. Every intervention risks an
adverse side effect requiring extra treatment, added hospitalization,
and ending with permanent patient injury or death in some cases.
The best therapy may harm, as the medical profession has long admitted.3 0 Adverse drug reactions may occur in as many as fifteen
percent of the hospitalized patient population.3 1 Deceptively simple
and commonplace procedures, such as venipuncture to draw blood
for testing, has drawn criticism for its unnecessary iatrogenic effects.3 2 Complications from standard procedures are common and
life-threatening in a significant percentage of cases. 33
The costs of patient injury due to iatrogenesis or medical error
are substantial. The risks of hospitalization "are not trivial... the
risk of a serious problem may well have increased."' 34 The costs of
adverse outcomes due to surgical error are particularly high. One
study concluded that the total cost of hospitalization for a group of
surgical patients who experienced adverse outcomes of surgery was
$1,732,432, 1.3% of the hospital's patient-service billings for the
year.3 5 Excess costs totalled $1,304,152 (about $40,000 per patient
and $1,000 per patient day.) 36 Iatrogenic effects are therefore an
important contributor to expensive resource use of medical care.
Diagnosis is central to clinical managment of patients. Yet diagnostic errors can lead to serious patient injury. Doctors often use
tests when they are unnecessary and even counterproductive. The
30. See Barr, Hazards of Modern Diagnosis and Therapy-The Price We Pay, 159 J.
A.M.A. 1452 (1955); Moser, Diseases of Medical Progress, 255 NEW ENG. J. MED. 606
(1956).
31. Karch & Lasagna, Adverse Drug Reactions: A CriticalReview, 234 J.A.M.A. 1236
(1975).
32. See Smoller & Kruskall, Phlebotomyfor DiagnosticLaboratory Tests in Adults: Pattern of Use and Effect on Transfusion Requirements, 314 NEw ENG. J.MED. 1233 (1986).
33. See Burnum, Medical Vampires, 314 NEW ENG. J.MED. 2250 (1986) (noting that
life-threatening complications associated with intraortic ballon pumping occur in more than
16% of the cases; that few patients in intensive care units have not experienced complications; and that major complications occur in 17% of patients after tracheostomy).
34. Steel, Gertman, Crescenzi & Anderson, latrogenicIllness on a GeneralMedical Service at a University Hospital, 304 NEW ENG. J.MED. 638 (1981).
35. Couch, Tilney, Rayner & Moore, The High Cost ofLow-Frequency Events, 304 NEW
ENG. J.MED. 634 (1981).
36. Id.; see also Zook & Moore, High-Cost Users of Medical Care, 302 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 996 (1980).
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reasons include medical training, which teaches the doctor to abhor
uncertainty and to divide up a problem into components; peer approval, since a thorough workup impresses colleagues; and available
technology, the mere existence of which compels use.37 Medical decisions made by both patients and doctors are often biased toward
greater use of technology, even if its use is inappropriate.38 Doctors
may overestimate the positive value of diagnostic methods, failing
to note that there often is no demonstrated link between a test or a
treatment and a good outcome. Robin observes:
The alarming fact is that, for most tests in medicine, we have no
acceptable information on either diagnostic efficiency or therapeutic efficiency. Thus, a whole host of procedures, some of
them highly invasive and with the potential to be life-threatening,
are performed almost routinely ....At the least, excessive test(or for society); at
ing creates unnecessary expense for the patient
39
the most, it causes harm to the patient.

Medical decisionmaking may fail to consider the merits or necessity of diagnostic testing and treatments, failing to adequately
consider the costs and risks of a procedure.' Critics have advocated conscious weighing by clinicians of costs, risks, and benefits of
various treatments and tests. Causes of medical decisionmaking errors may include "[i]nsensitivity to the prevalence of disease, distortion of many probabilities, a tendency to use irrelevant data to
support hypotheses, resistance in giving up hypotheses even when
there is convincing opposing information, greater ease of recalling
more recent events, and altered judgment due to physical and emotional stress."4 1
The "cascade effect" alluded to earlier is one example of excess
costs generated by cumulative diagnostic and treating errors. In
37. See Spiro, Gastrointestinal Illness: The Hungerfor Certainty, in THE MACHINE AT
THE BEDSIDE 341 (S.J. Reiser & M. Anbar eds. 1984) [hereinafter cited as REISER &
ANBAR].

38. See Bursztajn, Hamm & Gutheil, The Technological Target: Involving the Patient in
Clinical Choices, in REISER & ANBAR, supra note 37, at 177, 190.
39. E. ROBIN, supra note 20, at 40. For a detailed discussion of the evaluation of diagnostic technologies and the limits of present evaluation methods, see INST. OF MED., ASSESSING MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 80 (1985).

40. A diagnostic tool, for example, should pass two tests: it should potentially change
the course of remedial action, and the benefits should exceed its cost (or risk). Anbar, The
Penalties of Excessive Inquisitiveness, in REISER & ANBAR, supra note 37, at 279. For a
recent study of outcomes when the level of a medical treatment is reduced, see Zibrak, Rossetti & Wood, Effect ofReductions in Respiratory Therapy on Patient Outcome, 315 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 292 (1986).
41. Young, Williams & Eisenberg, The Technological Strategist: Employing Techniques
of Clinical Decision Making, in REISER & ANBAR, supra note 37, at 153, 168.
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clinical medicine, such a cascade effect occurs when "small commissions, omissions, miscalculations, or errors of judgment" accumulate, usually catalyzed by doctor anxiety and the need to do
something.42 The sources of this effect include a poor data base; an
error in data analysis; underestimation of the risks of evaluation or
treatment, often due to ignorance of the possibility of false positives;
and unwillingness to risk a bad outcome. The most common impetus, however, is medical decision heuristics, or rules of thumb to
guide decisionmaking, which lean toward intervention when in
doubt. These heuristics often lack empirical justification. They impel action rather than inaction, commission instead of omission"When in doubt, do it."43 The choice to avoid action is anxiety
producing, unless the doctor learns that an ill-considered diagnostic
approach or treatment can generate serious excess costs in the form
of patient injury.
Cost is already an integral part of the clinical decision, in the
sense that a cost is incurred when a diagnosis is missed or an error
leads to patient injury. A risk of a treatment, if it materializes, will
cost money-to the patient, to the institution, and to society. The
simplest medical decisions inherently involve risk-benefit calculations. Medical decisions are based upon probability estimates,
although usually ignored or hidden. Data are often lacking for a
rational decision.' The substantial areas of uncertainty in medical
practice, coupled with the imperative to use available tools and to
reduce uncertainty, lead to excessive patient exposure to risk-and
when that risk materializes, excessive costs.
Explicit cost-effectiveness calculations, where possible, are desirable. One strategy is more "cost effective" than another, in
Doubilet's formulation, "if it is (a) less costly and at least as effective; (b) more effective and more costly, its additional benefit being
worth its additional cost; or (c) less effective and less costly, the
added benefit of the rival strategy not being worth its extra cost."4 5
Such a test is hard to apply, but at least it draws medical decisionmaking toward an awareness of the costs and the downside of
42. Mold & Stein, The Cascade Effect in the Clinical Care ofPatients,314 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 512, 513 (1986).
43. Eddy, Variationsin Physician Practice: The Role of Uncertainty, 3 HEALTH AFF.,
Fall 1984, at 74, 85.
44. "Much of medical care is based on a limited and often distorted data base and limited experience, so that potential risks tend to be underestimated and potential benefits tend
to be overestimated." E. ROBIN, supra note 20, at 8.
45. Doubilet, Weinstein & McNeil, Use and Misuse of the Term "Cost-Effectiveness" in
Medicine, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 253, 254 (1986).
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overtesting or treatment." A single optimal medical strategy may
be difficult to articulate, given problems in defining acceptable dollar tradeoffs for years of life gained or lost or other health benefits.
Doubilet adds, "What is cost effective in an economically well-endowed health care setting may not be so in a more financially constrained situation."'4 7
Acknowledgment of uncertainty where data are lacking has become a major proposal in recent writings on medical care. Physicians have always made tradeoffs based on cost, without stating so
explicitly, based upon the individual patient.4 8 That such calculations are difficult to make, and that data are often lacking, does not
make the effort less worthwhile. Specialty-wide protocol setting, a
practice urged by Wennberg, Eddy, and Morreim, 4 aims to reduce
the uncertainty of medical practice and its attendant costs. What
Friedson terms "the fat of unexamined practices" needs to be
trimmed by clinical and specialty introspection. Can tort litigation
reinforce pressure toward such trimming? It can and must do so, as
part of reducing the overall costs of medical iatrogenesis.
B.

The Origins of a Medical Standard of Practice

Most clinical policies are not established by an external authority, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or the National Institutes of Health (NIH), but rather by a flow of reports in
the literature, at meetings, and in peer discussions. Over a period of
time, Eddy writes, "hundreds of comments can converge to form a
policy, which if widely accepted, will become 'standard practice.' "o This decentralized process of policy setting has advantages: the individual doctor benefits from collective widsom;
unproven bursts of enthusiasm are restrained; the best minds can be
involved, and can use statistical and other tools to test the policies;
and the standard setting is flexible, allowing adaptation to local values and skills." The problems are also serious, however: oversimplification, often ignoring side effects, costs, and risks; empiricism,
in which sweeping conclusions are drawn from a few observations;
46. See K. WARNER & B. LUCE, COST-BENEFIT AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS
IN HEALTH CARE: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICE AND POTENTIAL (1982).
47. Doubilet, Weinstein & McNeil, supra note 45, at 255.
48. See id.
49. Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice Variations: A Proposalfor Action, 3
HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984, at 6; Eddy, supra note 43; Morreim, supra note 12.
50. Eddy, ClinicalPolicies and the Quality of ClinicalPractice, 307 NEw ENG. J. MED.

343 (1982).
51. Id. at 346.
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case-selection biases; incentives that push overuse rather than underuse; an advocacy system in which counterarguments may be ignored; expertise and its attendant bias; policy based on consensus,
which may exist merely by force of repetition by the largest group
of voices; and the inertia of the status quo.52
The diffusion of new medical technologies poses special
problems. Once a new technology appears in the literature, most
doctors note it.5 3 Skepticism as to these research findings is not
common, even when it is appropriate. 4 In spite of lack of evidence
of efficacy, practitioners have fostered rapid adoption of new technologies such as CT scanning, magnetic resonance imaging, and respirator therapy. 5 Even if a practitioner is skeptical, the data and
opinions available are often inadequate to allow her to evaluate research findings, in that the studies themselves may have significant
defects. They may lack information as to how to translate limited
clinical research findings into practice, or little guidance may be
given to the practitioner for evaluating controversy over earlier
studies. Furthermore, the practitioner may not be aware of the
unique nature of clinical trials.5 6
The phenomenon of medical-practice variation highlights the
role of uncertainty in much of medical practice. Wennberg, whose
studies of variation are often cited, has observed:
[In Maine,] by the time women reach seventy years of age in one
hospital market the likelihood they have undergone a hysterectomy is 20 percent while in another market is [sic] is 70 percent.
In Iowa, the chances that male residents who reach age eightyfive have undergone prostatectomy range from a low of 15 percent to a high of more than 60 percent in different hospital markets. In Vermont the probability that resident children will
undergo a tonsillectomy has ranged from a low of 8 percent in
52. Id.
53. See Young, CommunicationsLinking ClinicalResearch and ClinicalPractice,in BIOMEDICAL INNOVATION 177 (E. Roberts, R. Levy, S. Finkelstein, J. Moskowitz & E. Sondik
eds. 1981).
54. See id. at 182.
55. See 1 INTERN. J. TECH. ASSESS. IN HEALTH CARE (1985) for a full issue devoted to
magnetic resonance imaging, spectroscopy, and technology diffusion. Shock-wave dissolution
of gallstones may be the newest rapidly diffusing treatment for a problem that has been hard
to treat. See Saverbruch, Delius, Paumgartner, Holl, Wess, Weber, Hepp, Ing & Brendel,
Fragmentation of Gallstones By ExtracorporealShock Waves, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 818
(1986). The quick acceptance of this "slam-bang" technology has preceded careful evaluation. Mulley, Editorial: Shock- Wave Lithotripsy: Assessing a Slam-Bang Technology, 314
NEW ENG. J. MED. 845 (1986).
56. See Young, supra note 53, at 190.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

1001

one hospital market to a high of nearly 70 percent in another.57
Wide variation has been observed in the use of laboratory tests,
prescription drugs, X-rays, return appointments, and telephone
consultations among similarly trained doctors in a wide variety of
practice settings. One study found a seventeen fold variation in lab
use among internists in their dealings with clinical patients. 58 Procedures most subject to variation are those for conditions related to
aging, where clinical trials are absent and the outcomes of conservation or nontreatment are unknown. In these circumstances, in the
absence of well-defined scientific norms, doctors have widely divergent opinions as to treatments. By contrast, those procedures least
subject to variation are those "for which there is a professional consensus on the preferred place or style of treatment."5 9 A study of
the use of a variety of medical and surgical services by Medicare
beneficiaries during 1981 confirmed the medical-practice variation
findings, documenting large variation "linked directly to the degree
of medical consensus concerning the indications for its use.", 60 The
authors were unwilling to equate high use with inappropriate use,
however, arguing that there are no clinical data available with
which to evaluate the appropriateness of using most procedures in
various clinical areas. The study suggests that doctors need to use
consensus techniques and decision analysis to address this
question.6 1
The attitudes of individual doctors influence the range of variation when consensus is lacking. Wennberg terms this the "practice
style factor."6 2 This factor can be explained in part by differences
of opinion when scientific information regarding outcomes is lacking; in other instances, it is unrelated to scientific controversies.
Wennberg writes:
Physicians in some hospital markets practice medicine in ways
that have extremely adverse implications for the cost of care, mo57. Wennberg, Dealing With Medical Practice Variations: A Proposalfor Action, 3
HEALTH AFF., 6, 9 (1984).
58. Schroeder, Kenders, Cooper & Piemme, Use of Laboratory Tests and Pharmaceuticals: VariationAmong Physicians andEffect ofCost Audit on Subsequent Use, 225 J. A.M.A.
969 (1973). For a general overview, see Luft, Economic Incentives and ClinicalDecisions,in
THE NEW HEALTH CARE, supra note 13.
59. Luft, supra note 58, at 102.
60. Chassin, Brook, Park, Keesey, Fink, Kosecoff, Kahn, Merrick & Solomon, Variations in the Use ofMedical andSurgicalServices by the Medicare Population,314 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 285, 288 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
61. For a discussion of consensus techniques, see Fink, Kosecof, Chassin & Brook, Consensus Methods: Characteristicsand Guidelinesfor Use, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 979 (1984).
62. Wennberg, supra note 57, at 7.
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tivated perhaps by reasons of their own or their patients' convenience, or because of individualist interpretations of the
requirements for "defensive medicine." Whatever the reason, it
certainly is not because of adherence to medical standards based
on clinical outcome criteria
or even on statistical norms based on
63
average performance.
The effects of this practice-style factor can be found not only in
clinical practice and treatment approaches, but also in hospital use.
A Michigan study found that hospital use varied tremendously
from community to community. High use communities had a fifty
percent greater propensity to hospitalize overall. 64 This use pattern
was driven by doctor decisionmaking as a cultural force with hospital use learned at the community level and transmitted across
specialties. 65
Medical practice may not provide a "cookbook" set of scientifically based practice standards for each set of symptoms. Even
where substantial consensus exists, the circumstances and preferences of individual patients necessarily shape treatment.6 The
strongest force in treatment decisions, however, is still the individual doctor's view of her choices in the face of uncertainty. Doctors
make decisions that harm patients-out of anxiety, ignorance, and
lack of introspection. Some of these decisions are mistaken, error as
we commonly use the word. Others are uninformed in terms of a
research base, even if standard practice. The link between malpractice law and cost containment is incomplete without a thorough understanding of the costs of medical error and its iatrogenic effects.
III.

MALPRACTICE AND MEDICINE:

THE MODEL OF THE

MIRROR OR THE LENS?

The effect of tort doctrine on medical practice is a complicated
one, with different doctrines applicable to the doctor and to the hospital. A careful doctrinal analysis reveals that courts have allowed
physicians substantial medical discretion at the clinical level, taking
into account resource limitations. At the same time, courts have
been less sympathetic to institutional practices that lead to iatrogenic results. The increased judicial scrutiny of the institution as
the primary health care provider is a step in the right direction.
63. Id.
64. Griffin, Wilson, Wolfe & Bischak, Clinical Characteristicsof Hospital Discharge
Rates in Local Communities, unpublished paper in possession of the author.
65. Id.
66. See Rubin & Hackbarth, ReViews: The FederalGovernment, 3 HEALTH AFF., Fall
1984, at 38.
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The current cost-containment initiatives by the federal and state
governments attempt to affect the cost of health care by affecting
physician and institutional behavior. In this environment, tort doctrine can serve to safeguard quality by encouraging peer review in
bureaucratic practice settings. The goal in struggling to achieve
both cost control and quality care should be to shape policies that
favorably manipulate the incentive structure common to
institutions.6 7
A. A Taxonomy of Medical Misadventure
The link between medical error and tort culpability is complex
and imperfect. The traditional view is that negligence is most often
the product of "heedlessness or carelessness, which makes the negligent party unaware of the results which may follow from his act."6
The theory of culpability for medical misadventure starts with a
common sense notion of error, as a deviation from an established
standard of care, which deviation could have been prevented and
which standard we expect the defendant to know. Willful and negligent acts leading to iatrogenic injury fit well within this traditional
view of malpractice. Two other categories of action or inaction fit a
bit more uneasily within the traditional framework.
1.

Willful and Negligent Acts

Willful acts encompass an intentional deviation from the professional ethical norms of practice, or from recognized procedures and
techniques for treatment, without good cause.69 Negligent acts are
measured against generally accepted norms of practice. The doctor
may deviate from accepted practice for a variety of reasons. Negligence can be due to inattentiveness on a particular occasion, even
though the doctor is otherwise skillful. It can be attributable to a
systematic failure of initial training or a failure to keep abreast of
current medical advances. 70 Or it can result from a personal incapacity of the doctor to deal with this particular disease or patient.7 '
The standard of care the courts apply in evaluating these errors
67. See F. WOLINSKY & W. MARDER, supra note 10, at 148.
68. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 145 (4th ed. 1971).

69. See Gonzales v. Nork, No. 228566, slip op. (Superior Ct., County of Sacramento,
Cal. Nov. 19, 1973), reproduced in S.LAW & S. POLAN, PAIN AND PROFrr: THE POLrrICs
OF MALPRACTICE 215 (1978) (excerpts from the opinion of Judge B. Abbott Goldberg).
70. In Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d
253 (1965), cert denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966), the doctor failed to read the latest texts on
setting bone fractures.
71. See Engelberg, Rising Stakesfor Negligent Doctors,N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1986, at E-5
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is objective: that level of care offered by a reasonable doctor in the
position of the defendant. Holding a doctor accountable for these
two categories of error is well accepted, since he has failed to
achieve that level of competence which his professional membership
indicates he should have achieved (and which he presumably could
have with diligence).
2. Fallibility with Regard to the ParticularPatient
Each patient is unique and cannot be approached as nothing
more than the total of the physicial and chemical mechanisms operating on and within him.72 The particular patient is affected by his
particular history with all its unique characteristics. Since physicians are not omniscient, perfect knowledge is not attainable. It is
therefore not always scientific ignorance that may be to blame, but
rather "ignorance of the contingencies of the environmental context."7 3 The best therapeutic judgment may thus turn out to be in
error, not because the therapist is willful or negligent or because the
pertinent science is primitive, but because of the inevitable limits to
the doctor's knowledge of the particular patient. Given the uncertainties of any therapeutic intervention on a particular patient,
every such intervention is an experiment which risks patient injury,
notwithstanding the profession's general knowledge of the intervention's common characteristics.
3.

Injuries of Ignorance

Much of medicine has been described as primitive, dependent on
"half-way technologies." '74 Such technologies attempt to "compensate for the incapacitating effects of certain diseases whose course
one is unable to do very much about ....[T]his level of technology
is, by its nature, at the same time highly sophisticated and profoundly primitive." 7 5
In some areas, medical treatment is in its infancy, with incomplete knowledge as to the etiologies of illness and modes of treat(discussing the naval surgeon, Commander Donal Billig, who was convicted of negligent
homicide for persisting in heart surgery in the face of his clear limitations).
72. See Gorovitz & MacIntyre, Toward a Theory of Medical Fallibility, 1 J. MED. &
PHIL. 51 (1976).
73. Id.
74. See Maxwell, The Iron Lung: Halfway Technology or Necessary Step?, 64 MILBANK
Q. 3 (1986), for a critique of the "half-way technology" concept as being oversimplified.
75. L. THOMAS, THE LivEs OF A CELL: NOTE OF A BIOLOGY WATCHER 33 (1974).
For Thomas' response to Maxwell, supra note 74, see Thomas, Response to James H. Maxwell's Essay, "The Iron Lung", 64 MILBANK Q. 30 (1986).
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ment. In other areas, treatment may depend upon techniques
which are not sufficiently perfected, creating substantial side effects
(like much cancer therapy and drug treatments generally). Iatrogenic effects or misadventures here are often an inevitable result
of the infant nature of a medical specialty. In fact, use of the word
"error" is inappropriate, since error implies an error-free alternative
of diagnosis or treatment. The injury is not due to the failure of the
individual physician; nor is it due to any culpable act on a specialtywide level. In some situations, of course, the whole profession may
have lagged, failing to integrate evidence of a desirable new practice
or risks of an accepted one. It might also be true that a medical
specialty has failed to pursue proper studies to transcend the limitations of the existing treatments. An effective tort standard must
therefore be sensitive to both concerns. It needs to indirectly encourage introspection with respect to current practices and their
limits, while at the same time vitiate liability for injury not linked to
error.

76

The doctor therefore contends that he cannot be held responsible for harm caused by scientific ignorance or fallibility as to unknowable particulars. If his motivations and intentions are
satisfactory and his choice of therapy acceptable within the limits of
current knowledge, the argument goes, adverse consequences are
not the doctor's fault. 77 This argument, while superficially attractive, fudges the issue by focusing on current knowledge. Rather,
more research, greater efforts at specialty consensus on diagnosis
and treatment, and more systematic efforts at analysis of cost-effective medicine might be in order. Iatrogenesis due to ignorance and
patient variation may in fact be reducible. In addition, this argument assumes a static state of medicine, while in fact research constantly reduces areas of uncertainty. Finally, the argument based
on patient uniqueness tends to snowball all too easily into the proverbial slippery slope, quickly becoming an excuse for all error.
Doctors could learn to do better at the clinical level in designing
experimental trials to evaluate various treatment approaches.7 8
Much of medicine deals with similar problems, even though afflicting different people, for which standard responses are possible.
76. Cf Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products, 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982) (court
pushed strict liability doctrine to its limits, suggesting that the state of the art in practice is
irrelevant since more could always be done to reduce risks with the investment of more
resources).

77. See Dagi, Cause and Culpability, I J. MED. PHIL. 349, 370 (1976).
78. See, eg., Guyatt, Sackett, Taylor, Chong, Roberts & Pugsley, Determining Optimal
Therapy-Randomized Trials in IndividualPatients, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 889 (1986).
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And tort doctrine does in fact incorporate substantial leeway to account for sensitivity to the particular patient.
B.

Parametersof Tort Doctrine: Reflections in the Mirror

The standard of care, for purposes of a tort suit, must be viewed
from two perspectives: the institution and the doctor. The tort
standard of care operates primarily as a mirror of prevailing practice, but it may also serve as a lens, subjecting current practices to
scrutiny in some situations. How much risk do doctors and hospitals face from malpractice suits in a world of cost constraints?
1. The Doctor
The tort system in malpractice cases uses the customary practice
of the profession to determine the standard of care for physicians.7 9
The model of the mirror governs strictly in many jurisdictions, with
professional standards given conclusive weight so that the trier of
fact is prohibited from rejecting the customary practice as improper.80 Other jurisdictions allow some flexibility to the physician
who deviates from the customary practice. 81 For example, departure from customary practice may be justified, at least in some jurisdictions, if the defendant can present evidence that the prevailing
practice is dangerous.8 2 Such evidence may consist of studies which
discuss the hazards of the prevailing practice. 3
The medical profession, therefore, has been allowed by most
79. One standard formulation is "that degree of care and skill which is expected of a
reasonably competent practioner [sic] in the same class to which he belongs, acting in the
same or similar circumstances." Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Ky. 1970).
80. See, eg., Holt v. Godsil, 447 So. 2d 191 (Ala. 1984); Senesac v. Assoc. in Obstetrics
& Gynecology, 141 Vt. 310, 449 A.2d 900 (1982). Statutes in some states accomplish the
same result. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-115(a)(1) (1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1908(1) (1984).
81. See, eg., Harris v. Groth, 99 Wash. 2d 438, 451, 663 P.2d 113, 120 (1983) ("The
degree of care actually practiced by members of the profession is only some evidence of what
is reasonably prudent-it is not dispositive.").
Judicial flexibility with respect to customary practice can also work to the physician's
disadvantage by holding him liable when he conformed to customary practice. See, eg., Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 299, 282 A.2d 206, 217 (1971) (adherence to the customary
practice does not mean there can be no prima facie case of negligence); Chiero v. Chicago
Osteopathic Hosp., 74 Ill. App. 3d 166, 392 N.E.2d 203 (1979) (evidence that defendant's
conduct conformed to general custom is not conclusive; it may be overcome by contrary
expert testimony).
82. See, eg., Toth v. Community Hosp., 22 N.Y.2d 255, 239 N.E.2d 368, 292 N.Y.S.2d
440 (1968).
83. See, e.g., Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 88 A.D.2d 217, 452 N.Y.S.2d 875
(1982).
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American courts to set its own tort standard of conduct simply by
adopting its own treatment practices. This standard is proved by
84
expert testimony as to the actual pattern of medical practice, usually without any evaluation of its effectiveness. Judicial deference is
usually attributable to both the judicial perception of the specialized
and arcane nature of medicine and the difficulties in assessing the
merits of the prevailing practice.
The most elaborate recent judicial analysis of the physician stan85
dard of care is found in Hall v. Hilbun, a 1985 Mississippi case.
In Hall, the court considered the problems of a small town Mississippi practitioner. The court identified two prongs comprising the
standard of care: a competence component and a resource component. Under the first prong, all physicians should be held to an
"objectively ascertained minimally acceptable level of competence
... given the qualifications and level of expertise he holds himself
out as possessing and given the circumstances of the particular
case."18 6 This competence component assumes access to knowledge
of the sort and degree possessed by practitioners elsewhere in the
United States. The court rejected the notion that conformity with
medical custom is conclusive of compliance with the standard of
care, holding that such conformity is only one factor to be considered. It did note, however, that failure to conform to a medical
custom "will generally lead inescapably to the conclusion that the
duty of care has been breached."8 " The Hall court, therefore, takes
the position that failure to comply with custom is presumptively
negligent, but the customary practice could be challenged in some
circumstances.
This reflects a common judicial view of custom, under which it
is either given conclusive weight or presumptive validity. If the
plaintiff can show that there is a better practice than customary
practice, then Hall,Helling 8 and a few other cases would allow the
plaintiff to prevail. A doctor's failure to meet the customary prac84. Most states require the plaintiff to present expert testimony by a physician as to the
standard of care, and, absent such testimony, defendant is entitled to a directed verdict. See,
ag., Reinhardt v. Colton, 337 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. 1983). But see Harris v. Groth, 99 Wash.
2d 438, 451, 663 P.2d 113, 120 (1983) (expert testimony may be provided by qualified nonphysician since "license to practice medicine, while important, is only one factor to be
considered").
85. 466 So. 2d. 856 (Miss. 1985).
86. Id. at 871.
87. Id. at 872.
88. Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974). In this well-known case,
the defendant ophthalmologist was found liable for failing to administer an intraocular pressure test for glaucoma to a patient well under 40 years of age. The standard of the profession
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tice, however, is usually held to be below acceptable practice levels,
unless the defendant can invoke an exception.
The resource component in Hall requires consideration of the
facilities, staff, services, and other equipment available to the practitioner in the institution. This follows the general recognition that
courts should take into account the locality, availability of facilities,
the nature of the practice, and the proximity of specialists and special facilities.8 9 This standard of care is a fluid average rather than
the best available technology. It reflects those "medical procedures
that have occurred with sufficient regularity in the past to become
90
unmistakably etched into the practice of the profession."
Some critics have objected to this, suggesting instead that the
standard should reflect practices approved by the leaders of the profession in order to encourage standards that are state-of-the-art in
diagnosis and treatment. Even without common use in practice,
medical conduct might then be evaluated against sound professional
practice on the basis of current medical research as to the "best
practice." 91 However, such criticism fails to reflect the downside
risk of the so-called "best practice" standard, especially with respect to high variation procedures described by Wennberg.9 2 What
the leaders do may be expensive, of unproven efficacy, or harmful.
The studies of medical practice variation demonstrate the lack of
sufficient information to justify many procedures and tools.
2.

Exceptions to the "Customary Practice" Standard

Courts have allowed doctors to deviate from customary practice
under a variety of conditions.
a. Respectable Minority Rule. This doctrine allows for variation in clinical judgment, holding that "a physician does not incur
liability merely by electing to pursue one of several recognized
courses of treatment."9 3 Distinctive practices must be supported by
at least a respectable minority within the professional group to allow the judge to direct a verdict rather than leave the question for
of ophthalmology did not require the giving of a routine pressure test to persons under age
40. See infra notes 162-72 and accompanying text.
89. See Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Ky. 1970).
90. See King, In Search of a Standardof Carefor the Medical Profession: The "Accepted
Practice" Formula, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1213, 1237 (1975).
91. See id. Cf Chumbler v. McClure, 505 F.2d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1974) (standard not
determined "solely by a plebiscite").
92. See supra notes 57, 62-63 and accompanying text.
93. Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 87 (Me. 1974) (citation omitted).
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the jury to resolve based upon the conflicting testimony of the proponents of the two opinions. 94 In the typical case, the minority approach is followed by at least a few doctors, and is the "best
available" for a certain problem.9 5
b. The Best Judgment Rule. Courts often accord physicians
some latitude in the clinical setting, using the rubric of the physician's "best judgment." So long as the profession recognizes a difference of opinion as to a mode of diagnosis or treatment, "a

physician who uses his own best judgment cannot be convicted of
negligence, even though it may afterward develop that he was mistaken."9 6 Courts speak vaguely of room for the exercise of good
medical judgment.97 This may mean that a doctor, concerned
about the risks of a particular treatment, was conservative and did
not treat. 98 The doctor could attempt to present a reasoned defense
of his treatment decision to either reject the standard of care, or to
show that the standard was not clear and unanimous.
This does not mean that the "error in judgment" makes judgment an easily invoked shield against liability. The defendant must
still have made a choice within the realm of the reasonable in terms
of medical judgment. 99 It is therefore actually a subset of the respectable minority rule in recognizing that the choice, even if damaging to the patient in retrospect, was acceptable at the time
made. loo
94. See Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 549 P.2d 1099 (1976). In one case
recognizing the respectable minority rule, the minority, of which the defendant was a part,
consisted only of himself, which hardly seems "respectable." Chumbler v. McClure, 505
F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1974).
95. See Leech v. Brailiar, 275 F. Supp. 897 (D. Ariz. 1967) (sixty-five doctors in country
used prolotherapy for whiplash with claimed eighty-five percent success rate; defendant held
liable because he varied the treatment and therefore became a minority of one within the
respectable minority).
96. Snyder v. St. Louis Sw. Ry., 228 Mo. App. 626, 640, 72 S.W.2d 504, 512 (1934)
(quoting Judge Cox, Bailey v. Railroad, 296 S.W. 477, 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934) (citations
omitted)).
97. See Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985).
98. See, eg., Haase v. Garfinkel, 418 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. 1967) (refusal of doctor to use
anticoagulants for coronary artery disease in light of their risks to the patient and fact that no
medication would prolong life in coronary heart disease).
99. See, eg., Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n, 191 Conn. 282, 299, 465 A.2d 294, 303
(1983); Spike v. Sellett, 102 Il. App. 3d 270, 273, 430 N.E.2d 597, 600 (1981) ("If a doctor
has given a plaintiff the benefit of his best judgment, assuming that judgment to be equal to
that ordinarily used by reasonably well-qualified doctors in similar cases, he is not liable for
negligence, even if that judgment is erroneous.").
100. See Roberts v. Tardif, 417 A.2d 444, 448-49 (Me. 1980) ("A doctor is not liable for
injury resulting when he pursues one of several acceptable courses of treatment meeting the
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c. ClinicalInnovation. The best judgment exception is related
to the situation in which the doctor chooses a new approach.
Courts have been willing to allow innovation while distinguishing it
from experimentation. Where the established techniques pose risks
to the particular patient, courts have held it permissible to attempt
"therapeutic innovation," if the doctor reasonably calculated that
the innovation would accomplish the same goal as the customary
practice.' 1 This exception thus seems to reflect judicial recognition
of patient variation, 0 2 legitimating unproven approaches when the
particular patient fails to respond to more "standard," customary
treatments. It is particularly apt when the treatment is a desperate
attempt to save a patient from predictable and imminent death or

deterioration. 103
3.

The Hospital

When a patient is injured by an agent or instrumentality of the
hospital, or a claim is made that the hospital's equipment was deficient or missing, the hospital must be compared to a standard in
determining tort liability. The standard may be another hospital of
the same size and resources in the same locality or in a similar locality. It may reflect the national average or simply a "reasonable hospital" standard. Most courts apply a standard which reflects both
the baseline of practice required for Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) accreditation and a resource-sensitive component which takes into account the hospital's size and
resources.
a. Minimum National Standards. The application of JCAH
national accreditation standards has doomed the locality rule as applied to hospitals. The test is now monolithic: that degree of skill
which is expected of a reasonably competent hospital in the same or
similar circumstances. As in cases brought against physicians, advances in the profession, availability of special facilities and specialapplicable standard of care in the circumstances, even though an alternative procedure also
meeting that standard might have avoided the injury."); Miller v. Scholl, 594 S.W.2d 324
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (failure of ophthalmologist to use procedure of phacoemulsification not
negligent, since in "cradle stage of use and required a 'rather elaborate' piece of equipment"
not available in the area); see also J. KING, THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 69-70 (2d
ed. 1986) (citing Cebula v. Berroit, 652 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)).
101. See, e.g., Brook v. St. John's Hickey Memorial Hosp., 380 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. 1978).
102. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974) (the experiment was therapeutic in intention, to be judged by traditional malpractice evidentiary standards).
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ists, together with all other relevant considerations, are to be taken
into account-"°
b. Service and Equipment Shortfalls. A hospital is generally
not liable for a failure to utilize the latest technology. As the court
stated in Emory University v. Porter:
A hospital owes to its patients only the duty of exercising ordinary care to furnish equipment and facilities reasonably suited to
the uses intended and such as are in general use under the same,
or similar, circumstances in hospitals in the area ....

It is not

required to furnish the latest or best appliances, or to incorporate
in existing equipment the latest inventions or improvements 10
even
5
though such devices may make the equipment safer to use.
So long as the equipment was widely accepted, generally used, and
functioned as designed, more modern equipment is not necessary to
avoid liability.1 06 Even if a tool, such as the expensive CT scanner,
has come into common use, a smaller and less affluent hospital can
argue that it should be judged by the standards of similar hospitals
with similar resources. This differential standard, reflecting resource variation between hospitals, protects a hospital in a situation
10 7
where expensive devices would threaten its financial solvency.
However, if an institution lacks a piece of equipment which has
come to be recognized as valuable, particularly for diagnosis, it may
have a duty to transfer the patient to an institution which does have
10 8
such equipment.
This generous judicial allowance for older equipment by some
courts is now confronting the strict liability arguments imported
104. Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975).
As to the JCAH baseline, see generally lost, The Joint Commission on Accreditation ofHospitals: Private Regulation of Health Care and the Public Interest 24 B.C.L. REv. 835 (1983);
Dickinson v. Mailliard, 175 N.W.2d 588 (Iowa 1970).
105. 103 Ga. App. 752, 755, 120 S.E.2d 668, 670 (1961); accord, Starnes v. CharlotteMecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 28 N.C. App. 418, 221 S.E.2d 733 (1976).
106. See Lauro v. Travelers Ins. Co., 261 So.2d 261 (La. Ct. App. 1972).
107. A small rural hospital or a poor urban one may not be able to escape liability altogether, however. Companies such as Diagnostek now transport portable scanning units from
hospital to hospital, particularly in rural areas, on a scheduled basis. A hospital that fails to
schedule patients that might benefit from a scan could then be liable for a diagnostic shortfall
that results in patient illness that could have been treated with a proper early diagnosis.
108. In Blake v. D.C., No. 2623-80, slip op. (D.C. Super. Ct., June 30, 1981), a trial court
allowed a case to go to the jury where the plaintiff's estate claimed that she died because of
the hospital's failure to own a CT scanner to diagnose her condition. The hospital lacked the
scanner because of cost-based rationing imposed by controls on the hospital's capital expenditures. The court instructed the jury regarding the duty to transfer in such circumstances.
The case is discussed in Mehlman, RationingExpensive Lifesaving Medical Treatments, 1985
Wis. L. REv. 239, 287.
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from product defect litigation. Since so much of medicine relies on
medical devices, courts have in some cases applied product liability
concepts. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was
invoked in Grubb v. Albert Einstein Medical Center,'0 9 involving a
defective plug cutter. The court's language reflects the increasingly
central role of the hospital in the delivery of medical services: "[I]f
a hospital supplies equipment to an operating physician the hospital
must appraise themselves of the risks involved and adopt every effort to insure the safety of the equipment chosen."1 1
Other courts have applied implied warranty principles drawn
from the Uniform Commercial Code, again using a strict liability
approach in effect.I"1 Many of the res ipsa loquiturcases involve the
failure of medical devices during surgery, and in effect are imposing
strict liability under the guise of the res ipsa doctrine. '1 2 The standard regarding equipment thus is twofold: while a hospital need
not have the newest equipment, so long as its equipment is used by
other similarly situated hospitals, any defects in the equipment
which result in patient injury may also result in a strict liability
standard in future cases.
c. Minimum Facility and Support Requirements. Inadequate
facilities or lack of support have led courts to impose liability on
hospitals and clinics. Thus, a hospital must be equipped and prepared to treat the range of problems and side effects attendant to
procedures they offer. In Hernandez v. Smith'I 3 an obstetrical
clinic lacked surgical facilities for Cesarean sections and was liable
for "the failure to provide proper and safe instrumentalities for the
4
treatment of ailments it undertakes to treat ....
Inadequate staffing has been rejected as a defense, at least when
the available staff could have been juggled to achieve close supervision of a problem patient.1 15 Some decisions have suggested that a
109. 255 Pa. Super. 381, 387 A.2d 480 (1978).
110. Id. at 401, 387 A.2d at 490.

111. See, e.g., Skelton v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 459 So. 2d 818 (Ala. 1984) (liability
where suture needle broke off during surgery).
112. See, e.g., Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1975) (court shifted
burden of proof to defendants to exonerate themselves in case involving defective surgical
tool).
113. 552 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1977).
114. Id. at 144 (quoting Medical & Surgical Memorial Hosp. v. Cauthern, 229 S.W.2d
932, 934 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); see also Valdez v. Lyman-Roberts Hosp., 638 S.W.2d 111
(Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (obstetrics unit could not handle ruptured uterus).
115. See, e.g., Horton v. Niagara Falls Memorial Med. Center, 51 A.D.2d 152, 380
N.Y.S.2d 116 (1976).
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medical facility may narrow the scope of its obligations by informing the patient of its limitations. 116 This will be a very narrow defense, however, since the institution must comply with minimum
standards for accreditation and must comport with the standard of
care of hospitals with similar resources.
The centrality of institutional delivery of health care has
prompted courts to expand vicarious liability doctrine to cover the
negligent acts of doctors, even when they are independent contractors. 1 7 The next step, direct corporate liability for medical errors
attributable to staff, has been taken in some jurisdictions. Having
accepted enterprise liability arguments in other spheres, the judicial
move from vicarious liability to direct liability is a short step. Thus,
hospitals have been held directly responsible for incompetence in
their medical staff, if it should have detected the incompetence at
the time of initial appointment, during peer review, or at the time of
contract or privileges renewal."' This has even been extended in a
recent case to impose the obligation on a hospital, as opposed to the
doctor, to procure a patient's informed consent. 9
Strict liability has also been recognized as a cause of action in a
case involving hospital services rather than equipment. In Johnson
v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,' 2 ° the court ruled that mechanical and
administrative services provided by hospitals should not be exempt
from strict liability as a matter of law. "[I]t is in the public interest
that those services which hospitals perform for both doctors and
patients be performed properly."1 2 '
What is emerging is a differential standard of care under which
hospitals are subjected to increasing scrutiny for the services they
render, including the furnishing of equipment, personnel, and most
important, medical care. As hospitals and alternative site providers
assume increased responsibilities, including supplying complex
technologies of diagnosis and treatment, middle-level managers to
116. See, eg., Hernandez v. Smith, 552 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1977). Cf.Wilmington Gen.
Hosp.v. Manlove, 54 Del. 10, 15, 174 A.2d 135, 140 (1961) (liability for refusal to treat in an
emergency "if the patient has relied upon a well-established custom of the hospital to render
aid").
117. See, e.g., Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972).
118. See, eg., Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill.2d 326, 211
N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); Pedroza v. Bryant, 101 Wash. 2d 226,
677 P.2d 166 (1984); Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156
(1982). For a general discussion, see Peters & Peraino, Malpracticein Hospitals: Ten Theoriesfor Direct Liability, 12 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 254 (1984).
119. Magana v. Elie, 108 Ill.
App. 3d 1028, 1029, 439 N.E.2d 1319, 1320 (1982).
120. 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
121. Id. at 1067.
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monitor treatment costs, and utilization-review managers to balance
doctor wishes against cost constraints, they are raising the standard
against which institutional conduct will be judged.' 22
Can a hospital successfully defend against a suit in which the
patient claims that he was injured by a cost-cutting decision, implemented by the doctor in response to institutional incentives? The
incentive systems supply only indirect pressure, and no hospital imposes specific treatment guidelines. The hospital might therefore
try to argue that clinical decisionmaking responsibility lies only
with the doctor, as it always has. This argument is not likely to be
successful in the current judicial climate.
Suppose the doctor engages in expensive, contraindicated diagnostic testing and treatment. Suppose further that he thereby generates cascade effects in his patients because of false positive test
results and the iatrogenic effects of treatment and surgery. A patient who is injured by the actions of this doctor would have a difficult time proving negligence, given the variation which surrounds
many treatment approaches and the defense of best judgment. On
the other hand, the hospital undertakes utilization review, peer review, and systematic audits of staff performance for both quality
and cost control. If the pattern of iatrogenesis emerges from an
audit of the doctor's records, then the hospital should be liable in
negligence for failing to rescind or reduce his staff privileges.12 3
4.

Tort Duties: Recurring Situations

a. The Duty of Nonabandonment. The doctor-patient relationship, which is a contractual one with a fiduciary component, can be
terminated by mutual agreement or by the patient unilaterally. The
general rule regarding abandonment is that one who engages a doctor or hospital for treatment implicitly engages such services for the
duration of the illness, or until the services are no longer needed.
Abandonment occurs when the physician refuses to continue treatment because of the patient's inability to pay, or when the doctor
122. See Marsh, Health Care Cost Containmentand the Duty to Treat, 6 J. LEGAL MED.
157, 173 (1985):
It is highly unlikely that any hospital in the future will be permitted to insulate itself
from liability by arguing in favor of the traditional independence of the physicianpatient relationship, while at the same time instituting specific DRG "treatment and
discharge" time frames, standardized testing procedures, and other compelling cost
saving measures.
123. See Knapp v. Palos Community Hosp., 125 Ill. App. 3d 244, 465 N.E.2d 554 (1984);
cf supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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fails to discover and treat the patient's illness.12 4 Refusal to pay has5
12
not been recognized as a defense to the charge of abandonment.
The role of standards defined by outside organizations such as
JCAH are increasingly important in addressing abandonment concerns. 126 The current JCAH manual states that "[i]ndividuals shall
be accorded impartial access to treatment or accommodations that
are available or medically indicated, regardless of race, creed, sex,
national origin, or sources of payment for care." 127 This standard,
along with state policies that complement it, are cited with approval
in Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 28 where the court
held that reasonable cause for patient transfer must be based on
medical considerations, "not economic considerations relevant to
the welfare of the hospital."12' 9 The theory of liability is therefore in
place; what is needed are both plaintiffs willing to sue and lawyers
with sufficient incentives to take the cases.
b. The Duty to Terminate Treatment. A duty to terminate
treatment may be found when the treatment is ineffective or dangerous. A doctor has a duty to act in good faith toward her patient,
informing him when a method of treatment is of no benefit. 30 This
includes a duty to advise a patient to consult a specialist or one who
might furnish better treatment when the doctor knows or should
know that her treatment is not providing relief or effecting a
cure.

13 1

Entin describes the situation where the perverse incentives of
the DRG system can tempt a hospital to retain a patient for treatment to enhance reimbursement. 132 While DRG standards will
124. See, eg., Ascher v. Gutierrez, 533 F.2d 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Ricks v. Budge, 91
Utah 307, 64 P.2d 208 (1937); Gray v. Davidson, 15 Wash. 2d 257, 130 P.2d 341 (1942).
125. See, eg., Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., 285 N.Y. 389, 34 N.E.2d 367 (1941).
See generally Comment, The Action of Abandonment in MedicalMalpractice Litigation, 36
TUL. L. REV. 834 (1962).
126. See generally Olender, Breach of ConsumerStandards: Violations May Lead to Medical Negligence, 22 TRIAL 39 (Apr. 1986).
127. JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 1986 xi (1985).

128. 141 Ariz. 597, 688 P.2d 605 (1984).
129. Id at 606, 688 P.2d at 611.
130. See Annot., 35 A.L.R. 3d 349 (1971).
131. See, eg., Ison v. McFall, 55 Tenn. App. 326, 400 S.W.2d 243 (1964); Larsen v.
Yelle, 246 N.W.2d 841 (Minn. 1976) (physician in general practice liable for failing to refer
patient with fractured wrist to orthopedic specialist). See generally PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL
ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION § 8 (requiring doctor to seek consulta-

tion "whenever it appears that the quality of medical services may be enhanced thereby").
132. See Entin, DRGs, HMOs, and PPOs: IntroducingEconomic Issues in the Medical
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likely be amended over time to correct such disincentives, the tort
theory of failure to refer provides a useful transitional argument
when injury is due to inadequate treatment or facilities.
c. The Duty to Obtain Informed Consent. A doctor must disclose information material to a patient's decision and ensure that
the patient understands the risks of both the proposed test or treatment and any alternatives. Informed consent doctrine varies substantially among the states, with half the states controlling its
operation by statute. 133 In the few cases which get to the jury, the
plaintiff often loses at trial 134 or has a verdict overturned on

appeal. 135
In the cost-containment environment, informed consent doctrine has been seen as a way of constructing a shield against liability
for the doctor who makes a clinical rationing decision. Informing a
patient of the reasons for nontreatment-primarily, the lack of resources to cover the cost of a treatment which would otherwise be
required-may absolve liability, some would argue. But such an
approach is a troublesome solution. Many poor or elderly patients,
given the choice of nontreatment or referral to another institution
where they must pay out of pocket, will forego treatment. Allowing
the doctor, and therefore the institution, off the hook in this manner
provides too easy an escape from pressures toward efficient medical
practice and reduction of iatrogenic effects. In the long run, dumping patients through the informed consent pathway will cost society
more in aftercare costs because of delayed or denied treatment. As
Mariner writes:
[T]he use of informed consent to convert medical decision making into economic decision making seems wholly misplaced, a
variation of blaming the victim. Patients have the right to conMalpractice Case, 20 FORUM 674 (1985). Entin discusses the distinction made under prospective payment between discharges and transfers. A transferring hospital is paid a perdiem rate, while the final discharging hospital is paid at the full rate. A transferring hospital
cannot obtain outside reimbursement for excessive cost or length of stay. He notes:
This puts a heavy burden on the transferring hospital since the costs associated
with a hospital admission are usually much greater during the first days of admission, when the bulk of the testing and other more expensive care is delivered. Thus,
there is an incentive to resist discharges and transfers when the per-diem rate will
obviously provide inadequate reimbursement. In order to avoid a financial loss,
providers may unwisely try to continue to treat the patient in facilities that are not
as adequately suited to the care and treatment of a particular ailment.
Id. at 677.
133. See generally LeBlang, Informed Consent-Duty and Causation: A Survey of Current Developments, 18 FORUM 280 (1983).
134. See, e.g., Wheeldon v. Madison, 374 N.W.2d 367 (S.D. 1985).
135. See, eg., Precourt v. Frederick, 395 Mass. 689, 481 N.E.2d 1144 (1985).
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sider the costs of their care, but the burden of solving the economic crisis of the health care system cannot be placed upon
their shoulders alone, just136as it should not be placed on the shoulders of their physicians.
C. Risks of Suit: StretchingDoctrine and Reshaping Process
A series of case studies, capturing the range of cost-sensitive
contexts in which health care is currently being delivered, illuminates the interplay between medical decisionmaking sensitive to
cost constraints and the risk of a tort suit. The following five cases
present iatrogenic results linked to cost-sensitive decisions. The
legal response to these situations must be analyzed at two levels.
First, what is the likely legal outcome for the injured plaintiff, given
the current state of tort doctrine? Second, what refinements in tort
law and practice might be considered to facilitate a better response
to these situations?
1. The HMO System
The patient, a man in his late thirties, is diagnosed during a routine physical as having a potentially life-threatening heart arrhythmia. The patient is treated with a combination of diisopyramide
and propranolol, with no side effects. After five years, the man
moves and joins an HMO. The HMO cardiologist notes that
propranolol could have been tried alone, even though it presented a
small chance of a fatal heart attack. He also notes that diisopyramide costs $430 per year; the propranolol costs $26. Even a
significant increase in the propranolol dosage, involving little risk,
would cut the HMO cost by several hundred dollars if prescribed
37
without the diisopyramide.1
If the patient suffers a heart attack and dies, can the HMO avoid
liability by citing its cost-saving choice?
Provider sensitivity to cost is enhanced in the HMO or preferred
provider organization (PPO) situation.1 38 The definition of medical
necessity therefore becomes critical, with HMOs struggling to de136. Mariner, DiagnosisRelated Groups: Evading Social Responsibility?, 12 LAW, MED.
& HEALTH CARE 243, 244 (1984).

137. This case is drawn from Veatch & Collen, The HMO Physician'sDuty to Cut Costs,
15 HAsTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1985, at 13.
138. One must be careful here in lumping all HMOs together. They vary widely in design and in incentive structure, and their litigation experience also varies widely. The author
surveyed settled cases as described in the AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION LAW
REPORT over the past year (an admittedly unscientific data base). HMOs were named as
defendants, and paid out substantial sums, in several of the reported settlements.
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velop norms for admissions, lengths of stay, specialty referral, and
diagnosis and treatment alternatives. Justification for reduced
levels of care must be based not merely on cost considerations, but
139
rather on both cost and medical considerations.
Two lines of defense in the posited case are possible. The first is
to judge the HMO by the standards of other HMOs, arguing that a
similar practice is common among HMOs. Tort law would operate
as a multifaceted mirror, reflecting different standards in different
delivery settings. No cases can be found in the appellate records to
analyze judicial reactions to HMOs, which may suggest that injured
plaintiffs are avoiding suits for other reasons. The theoretical judicial question, however, is the proper weight to give the customary
practice: conclusive weight versus only some evidence? Given the
uncertainty at present as to the quality of care provided in terms of
the balance between patient risk and money saved, courts are likely,
if they adopt a separate HMO standard, to treat it only as some
evidence rather than conclusive. This is probably a desirable perspective until further evidence is available.
A second line of tort defense is to use the doctor as a guide to
the system who introduces the patient at the time of entry to HMO
cost constraints, explaining the capitation system. At the time of
the drug choice, the specifics should also be discussed with the patient, since the difference in risks in the two drugs, while small,
might be material to the patient (or to a "reasonable patient," in the
languge of most courts). Such a discussion would be essential to
avoid an informed consent count." 4
2.

The DRG World

One of four staff obstetricians in a hospital performs many fewer
Cesarean sections than does his colleagues. He feels that most women who have had a Cesarean section can have a normal vaginal
delivery with their second child, citing studies which find no differences in outcomes for the different delivery modes. The medical
director feels that the tradition of repeat Cesareans is strong and
that more research is needed before obstetric practice changes. He
139. See Entin, supra note 132, at 674.
140. For arguments in favor of differential standards of care applicable to HMOs, see
Curran & Moseley, The Malpractice Experience of Health Maintenance Organizations, 70
Nw. U.L. REV. 69 (1975); Bovbjerg, The Medical Malpractice Standard of Care: HMOs and
Customary Practice, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1375; Havighurst & Bovbjerg, Professional Standards
Review Organizations and Health Maintenance Organizations: Are They Compatible?, 1975
UTAH L. REV. 375.
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also notes that the hospital is losing money- on each of the doctor's
patients which delivers vaginally with a
previous Cesarean section
14 1
pregnancy.
subsequent
If a patient has problems with a vaginal delivery following a
Cesarean section, delivering a brain-damaged infant, can she sue?
The doctor could defend on two bases to a malpractice suit.
First, he could argue that the standard of care reflects substantial
variation and that he was following a respectable minority practice.
He could either call supporting medical witnesses or, as a second
best option, introduce medical research in treatises or journals
which supports his approach. Modem rules of evidence in most
states allow substantive use of treatises in the absence of expert witness support. 4 2 If obstetric practice is still largely unanimous as to
repeat Cesarean sections with second deliveries, however, the doctor is at risk in a jurisdiction which treats standard practice as conclusive, with the respectable minority exception requiring expert
testimony as to a distinct subgroup of practice.' 43 The desirable
judicial posture in this situation is to allow academic evidence with
respect to the effects and risks of both practices, allowing the doctor
a chance to argue that his position is an emerging respectable minority, even if he is alone in his stand.
Second, as with the HMO case, the doctor needs to inform the
patient of the risks and benefits of the various treatment choices in
order to avoid the risk of a count on informed consent. Unlike the
case where informed consent is used to shield the physician from
liability for a cost-related decision, this is a legitimate case for the
operation of the informed consent shield; the decision is fundamentally a medical one with substantial benefits for the mother in avoiding another Cesarean section.
3. Discharge or Abandonment
A woman experiencing back pain is referred by her physician to
a vascular surgeon who diagnoses Leriche's syndrome, a vascular
141. See Wasserman, The Doctor, the Patient,and the DRG, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Oct. 1983, at 23.

142. See generally FED. R. EVID. 803(18). Learned treatises are admissible
[to the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-examination
or relied upon by him in direct examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or
art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness
or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may
be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
143. See Schwartz, Commentary: The Doctor, The Patient, and the DRG, 13 HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Oct. 1983, at 24.
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insufficiency. Surgery is performed in the hospital to correct the
problem, and a few hours after surgery a thrombectomy is necessary because of a clot in the femoral artery. Six days later a right
lumbar sympathectomy is performed, and physiotherapy is started
to improve circulation to the right leg. The fiscal intermediary then
indicates that the patient should be discharged after a four-day extension, although the treating doctors prefer extended hospitalization. After discharge, the patient's thrombus recurs in the right
artery, and her leg is amputated to midthigh.'"
Does the patient have an action for her injury, and, if so, against
whom?
Such a discharge, where injury results, justifies an abandonment
cause of action. 145 The cost-risk tradeoff is sharply presented here,
since the physicians feel that they are constrained by the utilization
review forces. How to handle the problem? First, the doctor has an
obligation to talk with the audit reviewer and to exhaust procedures, discussing with the consulting physician the need for extended hospitalization in this particular case. Second, the doctor
should discuss the problem with the patient so that he is aware of
the dispute over the hospitalization or treatment. Third, if the dispute is not resolved, and the doctor discharges the patient, the institution, and perhaps the doctor, may be liable for breach of the duty
of nonabandonment, or at least breach of the duty to refer the patient to an outpatient facility. Liability may even be imposed on the
third party utilization review body, increasingly perceived as the appropriate target for cost-sensitive decisions which result in medical
error. 146 Utilization review is new but rapidly expanding, and liability for the denial of coverage of benefits can be predicted in other
situations resembling the posited case. If the audit organization
fails to properly select or consult with its physician consultants, this
can lead to liability. 4 7 If the hospital "decides" through its admin144. This is a variation on the Wickline case in California, where a jury returned a verdict
of $500,000 against the state of California for the acts of a nurse and a physician consultant
working for the Medi-Cal program. See Carlova, A Jury Lands a $500,000 Haymaker on
Health Bureaucrats,60 MED. ECON., May 16, 1983, at 80. In the subsequent appellate decision, the court held that the doctor should have done more: "[T]he physician who complies
without protest with the limitations imposed by a third party payor, when his medical judgment dictates otherwise, cannot avoid his ultimate responsibility for his patient's care."
Wickline v. State, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661, 671 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1986).
145. See, eg., Kekua v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 61 Hawaii 208, 601 P.2d 364 (1979).
146. See Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
147. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. v. Lavoie, 470 So. 2d 1060 (Ala. 1984) (punitive damage
award of $3,500,000 based on a finding that the insurer made a bad faith denial of the insured
claim).
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istrative procedures to reject the treating physician's recommendation regarding hospitalization, liability can also be predicated on a
direct corporate negligence theory.
4. Referral Forces
A doctor examines a boy brought into the emergency room of a
small community hospital after an auto accident with an injured leg
and foot. The X-ray suggests a dislocated foot. The doctor can
either try to reduce the dislocation in the hospital, or the boy can go
to an orthopedic specialist in a large city 110 miles away. Treatment in the community hospital generates a fee for the doctor,
while referral does not. 148 The doctor chooses to treat, and the
boy's foot is permanently injured as the result of the doctor's inexpert treatment.
Can suit be successfully brought?
This presents a problem that has always troubled medical practice. A doctor is expected to know the limits of his training and
resist the siren song of income when he is faced with a problem
which he is only marginally competent to treat. 149 The context is
cost and income sensitive, but no more so than has always characterized the practice of medicine.
5.

Dumping

A man is brought into the emergency room of a suburban hospital with multiple stab wounds and a concussion. The hospital
quickly determines that the man lacks insurance and is not eligible
for further Medicaid funds. The hospital administrator urges transfer to the urban public hospital, a two hour drive away. The delay
in transporting the man results in his death due to the head trauma.
Can the transferring hospital be held liable for failing to diagnose and stabilize the man's condition?
Hospitals have been dumping in large numbers in a struggle to
contain their costs by avoiding uninsured patients. Yet the duty of
nonabandonment, coupled with existing JCAH standards, provides
ample doctrinal support for an action by an injured patient who
suffers as the result of being transferred or dumped. Courts have
been extremely hostile to patient transfers, but hospitals persist in
148. The basic situation is taken from the essay by Hilfiker, Facing Our Mistakes, 310
NEw ENG. J. MED. 118, 119 (1984). Hilfiker did not intend the example to illustrate a cost
incentive problem.
149. See A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 47 (1975).
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such transfers in large numbers. Hospitals pragmatically estimate
that the costs of potential malpractice suits are outweighed by the
150
costs of retaining uninsured or underinsured patients.
Such a balancing of tort risks and treatment decisions leads to
consideration of the tort process, as opposed to tort doctrine, in affecting malpractice risk in the face of cost constraints.
D. The Tort Process: Filtering Out the Poor
The argument is simple. Hospitals believe the calculated risk of
incurring a malpractice suit to be low. They therefore continue
questionable practices, such as transferring uninsured patients.
Lawyers who operate on a contingency fee basis do not find suits on
behalf of poor or elderly patients financially rewarding. The higher
incidence of preexisting medical problems in these patients makes
proof of causation difficult, and their reduced or nonexistent earning capacity and short life expectancy reduce recoverable damages
if causation can be proved.15
The applicable standard of care is straightforward in many of
these negligent transfers cases. If the patient's condition has not
stabilized at the time of transfer, and the transferring hospital undertook some treatment, then abandonment is an available theory.
Informed consent requirements contained in the American Hospital
Association's Patient's Bill of Rights require disclosure of the rea1 52
sons for, and alternatives to, transfer.
The problem of reduced recoverable damages is real because the
elderly or the poor have little earning power, the standard measure
for damages. The pattern that is emerging-in nursing home litigation is relevant to this problem-pain and suffering is a major com150. See Schiff, Ansell, Schlosser, Idris, Morrison & Whitman, Transfers to a PublicHospital: A Prospective Study of 467 Patients,314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 552 (1986). The authors
found that "many patients are in a medically unstable condition at the time of transfer...
They concluded that this raised
serious questions about the private health sector's ability to consider the condition
and well-being of patients objectively, given the strong economic incentives to transfer the uninsured. The delay in providing needed medical services as a result of the
transfer process represents a serious limitation of the access to and quality of health
care for the poor.
Id. at 556.
151. See Kapp, supra note 23, at 249 ("The mechanics of the legal system itself-quite
apart from the merit of any specific claim-will likely serve as the most influential brake on
the use of malpractice litigation to enforce standards of quality care in the wake of DRGmotivated rationing."). Cf Rosenblatt, Rationing "Normal" Health Care: The Hidden Legal
Issues, 59 TEx. L. REv. 1401, 1415-16 (1981).
152. AMERICAN Hosp. Ass'N, PATIENT'S BILL OF RIGHTS (1975), cited in Schiff, supra
note 149, at 556.
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ponent of the awards, which have ranged from $50,000 to $1.35
million.1 1 3 This is true even though the elderly nursing home resident is old, frail, and has multiple maladies. Experienced litigators
on behalf of the elderly suggest arguing to the jury that the defendants have interfered
with the small but precious bit of life left to the
15 4
plaintiff.
This line of argument is consistent with the emerging "loss of a
chance" doctrine of causation. Under this theory, the plaintiff may
introduce evidence attempting to demonstrate that there was a
probable reduction in the statistical chance for survival, even
though it cannot be proven that with timely treatment the plaintiff
could have lived to his normal life expectancy. In Herskovits v.
' the plaintiff's chances
Group Health Cooperativeof Puget Sound, 55
of survival from lung cancer were reduced from an estimated thirtynine percent to twenty-five percent as the result of failure by the
hospital and doctor to promptly diagnose the cancer. The trier of
fact was allowed to weigh this "loss of a chance" in deciding
whether the evidence of increased risk caused the injury or death of
1 56
the plaintiff.
A failure by a hospital to stabilize a patient before transfer may
lead to liability. In Valdez v. Lyman-Roberts Hosp., Inc. 5 7 the
court was receptive to "loss of a chance" arguments in the dumping
context. The court's language is full of anger:
Even if it be assumed that her chances for recovery were remote,
the hospital would still be liable for depriving her of any chance
she might have had. The burning candle of life is such a precious
light in anyone's existence that no one has a right to extinguish it
before it flickers out into perpetual darkness and oblivion ....
Therefore, if the appellee hospitals accelerated Juanita Valdez'
death by even an hour, minutes, or seconds, they could be
153. See Nemore, Protecting Nursing-Home Residents: Tort Actors Are One Way, 21
TRIAL, Dec. 1985, at 54.

154. See id. at 88 (footnote omitted).
155. 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983).
156. For the initial statement of the argument, see King, Causation, Valuation, and
Chance In PersonalInjury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditionsand Future Consequences,
90 YALE LJ. 1353 (1981); Note, IncreasedRisk of Harm: A New Standardfor Sufficiency of
Evidence of Causationin Medical MalpracticeCases, 65 B.U.L. REV. 275 (1985). See also
Cullum v. Seifer, 1 Cal. App. 3d 20, 81 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1969) (evidence that prompt biopsy
might have lengthened life or increased patient's comfort level sufficient for new trial);
Monahan v. Weichert, 82 A.2d 102, 442 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1981) (even if acts merely speeded up
a result which was inevitable, recovery allowed to the extent that negligence brought the
condition on prematurely).
157. 638 S.W.2d I11 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).

1024

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:985

liable. 158
The tort process therefore possesses doctrinal tools available to
whet the appetite of the personal injury lawyer in his search for
plaintiffs. Nursing home litigation is on the increase, and dumping
litigation cannot be far behind.
IV.
A.

THE DOCTOR'S DILEMMA

Cost Constraints as a Defense

The argument that cost constraints should be allowable as a defense in a malpractice action is attractive. It offers the anxious doctor the hope of defending herself when she has made a choice that
saved money for the institution but resulted in patient injury. It
also oversimplifies the problem by assuming that doctors do not factor in cost considerations at present. Yet cost-sensitive arguments
have been accepted by the courts in a variety of ways: the aspect of
standard of care which considers available resources; the best judgment rule (or error of judgment rule) with its substantial discretion;
and informed consent doctrine.
Doctors and economists would like cost to be an explicit defense. Danzon argues that "the fact that social costs exceed expected benefits should be recognized as a defense against failure to
take costly precautionary measures."'1 59 The economist, sensitive to
the consumption of resources by our health care system, wants to
reduce the effect of malpractice rules which tend to encourage extreme measures of care, regardless of the cost and the marginal benefit of such care. The medical literature with respect to the cascade
effect, iatrogenesis in hospitals and surgery, and medical practice
variation points in the same general direction but diverges somewhat in focus. Balancing social cost with private benefit poses an
ethical dilemma; reducing the economic costs of iatrogenesis focuses on a different component of the problem of medical cost.
The ethicist supports a cost-based defense in extreme cases.
Where the doctor is caught between the powerful pressures of salary and status and the risk of suit, some ethicists suggest that she be
able to rebut the argument of failure to conform to the standard of
care by demonstrating fiscal constraints and lack of alternatives,
leaving it to the jury to resolve the resource tradeoff between patient
and society. Two arguments are given for recognizing this defense.
First, its absence will frighten doctors into refusing to be cost con158. Id. at 116.
159. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 17, at 223.
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scious at all due to the risk of tort liability. Second, physicians'
willingness to treat the poor will be chilled where insurance is lacking or Medicare or Medicaid entitlements are incomplete or
exhausted. 160
Cost constraints should not be a defense to a medical malpractice suit for several reasons. First, the absence of such a defense is
not likely to frighten doctors into refusing to be cost conscious. A
variety of pressures would continue to encourage both cost and efficacy, including the institutional pressures inherent in the incentive
systems discussed earlier, 161 as well as internal and external audits,
from peer review to PRO audits.
Second, a cost-based defense allows explicit rationing of care,
impacting on the poor most heavily. This effect would be all the
more invidious due to its randomness, with the extent of rationing
dependent upon the perspective of the individual physician and the
particular institution. Trading off acceptable care for reduced expense, at the level of the individual patient, leaves the poor patient
no recourse against medical error due to costcutting. Morreim has
termed this "bedside budget cutting" and has effectively delineated
1 62
its ethical limits.
Third, such a defense exculpates the doctor too easily. Rather,
the appropriate action might be to change DRO allowances, to refine IMO criteria, to alter PPO incentives, or to battle the hospital
administration. Doctors will remain in control of the gates to
health care and, therefore, will continue to possess substantial autonomy. Medical passivity in the face of corporate and other cost
containment pressures is neither desirable nor necessary. The goal
in this process is to set standards which provide a minimum, effective level of care, and then to add disclosure to patients of the kinds
of choices they have within the form of health care delivery system
they have chosen.
Fourth, prohibitive cost as a defense naively suggests that the
patient is ignorant of the choices made by the doctor. It also implies that the physician can be allowed to gamble with the patient's
welfare without jeopardy to his own income and status. In the long
run, this battle will be fought on other battlegrounds. In the
meantime, there is no reason for a new tort defense to exacerbate
160. See Morreim, Cost Constraints as a Malpractice Defense (in press, HASTINGS
CENTER REP.).

161. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
162. See Morreim, supra note 12, at 36.
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the conflicts over cost and medical necessity by creating an easy
escape valve.
Finally, a cost-based defense deflects attention from the merits
of explicit contracts between patients or groups of patients and
providers, where such cost considerations can be taken into account
in a systematic way and understood and accepted by patients. Certainly, the economists are correct in applauding the merits of the
contract model for allowing a range of care choices for health care
163
consumers, so long as the poor and uninformed are protected.
How can the tort system reduce the pressures on hospitals and
doctors to abandon the poor, especially in light of the likely increased incidence of litigation as the poor suffer injury due to costsensitive decisions? And how can the tort system protect the
"poor" hospital? Hospitals with severe resource limitations, such as
small rural hospitals or large urban public hospitals, can raise those
limitations as a defense in a tort suit. If the lack of resources produces substandard care, however, the tort standard of care will not,
and-as discussed above-should not, protect the institution. What
are the ensuing economic and social results? The defendant institution will expose public funding inadequacies to the journalistic and
legislative eyes. The small hospital will have to find ways to generate sufficient revenues or risk merger, absorption, or corporate
death. The choice is then between substandard care, with the liability costs it generates, and no care.
As political problems, these dilemmas are simply beyond the
ability of tort litigation to solve. However, the tort threat does provide a market pressure encouraging quality standards, at a time
when most of the market pressures are directed solely toward cost
containment and profit. Hospitals have prospered well so far under
prospective payment systems, 1" and it is too early to relax tort
standards in response to a nebulous fear of financial disaster.
B.

Uncertainty: Facing It, Reducing It, Sharing It

Doctors are afraid of uncertainty. Much of medical practice is
full of uncertainty as to the causes and treatments of illness. The
norms of tort law, vague as they often are, can provide a source of
incentives to push medical decisionmaking to (1) reduce the uncer163. See generally Havighurst, Reforming MalpracticeLaw Through Consumer Choice, 3
HEALTH AFF., Fall 1984, at 63; MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 17; Epstein, Medical

Malpractice: The Case For Contract, 1976 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 87.
164. See supra note 2.
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tainty surrounding various treatments, thereby reducing variation
and its attendant costs; and (2) share uncertainty with patients, as a
way of reducing both doctor anxiety and the social costs of medical
treatment. How can tort doctrine facilitate the handling of
uncertainty?
1. The Defense of Conservative Treatment
The case law has recognized, through the best judgment and
respectable minority exceptions to customary practice, the variation
attendant upon many medical practices. A doctor can successfully
defend nonintervention or refusal to prescribe when the procedures
at issue have substantial risks of harm to patients. Thus, in Haase v.
Garfinkel,'6 5 the court accepted the defendant's evaluation that certain drugs carried risks that justified nonuse. Where research evidence is developing as to risks of a current treatment, the defendant
may be able to argue successfully that caution counsels
nontreatment.
Critics of tort law argue that it seems to demand the perfect
(and most expensive) practice. The classic statement is found in
Clark v. United States:6 6
If a physician, as an aid to diagnosis, i.e., his judgment, does not
avail himself of the scientific means and facilities open to him for
the collection of the best factual data upon which to arrive at his
diagnosis, the result is not an error of judgment but negligence in
failing to secure an adequate167factual basis upon which to support
his diagnosis or judgment.
Once a diagnostic tool has come into widespread use and has become affordable, the threat of liability increases if the tool is not
used. This results in cases like Heling1 8 and its progeny, in which
courts reject a customary practice that fails to incorporate a simple
low cost diagnostic test. In these cases, the courts have used tort
doctrine as a lens, scrutinizing the prevailing practice, testing the
practice against a cost-benefit standard, and rejecting the customary
practice.' 69 These cases seem to violate the thesis that one is protected if he conforms to the customary practice.
165.
166.
167.
168.

418 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. 1967).
402 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 953 (quoting Smith v. Yohe, 412 Pa. 94, 105, 194 A.2d 167, 173 (1963)).
83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974). See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying

text.
169. See also Lundahl v. Rockford Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 93 Ill. App. 2d 461, 465, 235
N.E.2d 671, 674 (1968) ("the usual or customary procedure might itself be negligence");
Favalora v. Aetna Casualty & Surety, 144 So. 2d 544 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
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An argument may be available to a defendant in Helling-type
situations, however. In Clark,17 ° the court demanded that doctors
use the means to achieve the "best" data. In Helling, the test the
court mandated physicians to use was assumed to be harmless as
well as low in cost. Courts need to be educated to the fact that tests
carry risks, not only in their administration, but in potential for
overtreatment because of false positive results. In some cases, it can
also be demonstrated that testing is pointless, since no intervention
is possible regardless of the result. As discussed earlier, 171 doctors
themselves need to be educated as to the costs of medical practices
and the risks of acting in the face of uncertainty. Courts can do
more than mirror a customary practice which lacks adequate support. They can learn that inaction may reduce harm and its costs,
and that action may cause harm and added costs.
The court as a lens on medical practice needs to act cautiously
in demanding too much where the costs of intervention may be
high. A doctor should be able to argue that the standard conservative practice is justified or that he disagrees with the standard interventionist practice where evidence exists to discredit the standard
or to suggest clinical caution. Consider the Helling decision. It
could have been fought on different terms. The court considered
requiring the simple pressure test for glaucoma to be justified by a
simple application of the Learned Hand formula, B is less than PxL
(burden of precautions is less than the probability of harm times the
gravity of the injury). The court wrote that even though the chance
of glaucoma is one out of 25,000 in people under forty years of age,
that one person.., is entitled to the same protection, as afforded
persons over 40, essential for timely detection of the evidence of
glaucoma where it can be arrested to avoid the grave and devastating result of this disease. The test is a simple pressure test,
relatively inexpensive. There is no judgment factor involved, and
there is no doubt that by giving the test the evidence of glaucoma
can be detected. The giving of
the test is harmless if the physical
1 72
condition of the eye permits.
Helling is viewed as an example of judicial cost-benefit balancing, overriding customary practice when the practice strikes the balance to the detriment of the patient. It is cited as an example of
how courts will push a standard higher, consuming more resources.
That is a mistaken reading of Helling. Courts are umpires, passive
170. 402 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1968).
171. See supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
172. 83 Wash. 2d at 516, 519 P.2d at 983.
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recipients of evidence presented by the parties. What seems to have
been missing from Helling is a clear statement by the defendant
ophthalmologist of the costs of imposing the pressure test on all
patients, probably because the specialty of ophthalmology had not
sorted out the ramifications of routine testing. If evidence were
presented as to the risks of mandatory tonometry, the court might
have ruled differently.
The research evidence reveals that most patients with a high
measurement of intraocular pressure do not have glaucoma and
that patients with a high measurement who have glaucoma measure
less than one percent. Therefore, the false-positive rate is very high,
causing worry and expense for treatment of a nonexistent disease.
Moreover, treatment with drugs has not been proven to halt the
progression of glaucoma. 73 Would the presentation of this evidence, justifying the failure to routinely screen everyone for
glaucoma, have caused a different result in Helling? It undercuts
most of the court's assumptions about the merits of the test. The
profession had simply not faced the uncertainty surrounding its
own tests and incorporated the uncertainty into its own protocols.
It thus failed to convince the court.
2. Sharing Uncertainty
The doctrine of informed consent has generated tremendous
hostility in the medical profession, but it has also had some salutary
effects in improving the level of risk disclosure to patients.174 A
major component of disclosure in the medical setting involves sharing uncertainty with the patient. Jay Katz'7 5 argues that sharing
uncertainty is at the heart of the doctrine, observing that it can substantially reduce the number of medical misadventures.
A doctor practices better medicine when forced to distinguish
more clearly between treatments based upon "tested scientific evidence and those ...beset by uncertainties or based on conjecture
173. E. ROBIN, supra note 20, at 147. A recent discussion of the medical aspects of tonometry supports this conclusion, arguing in fact that the rate of false positives is much
higher than Robin suggests. See Fortess & Kapp, Medical Uncertainty, Diagnostic Testing,
and Legal Liability, 13 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 213 (1985). The authors assume a
sensitivity of 70% and specificity of 30%. Using a population of 25,000, they conclude that
the test would produce 17,500 false positives and one true positive. The large group would be
falsely labelled as at risk, requiring follow-up retesting over several years at great expense.
Members of the group would also suffer from the anxiety of being diagnosed with incipient
glaucoma.
174. See Novack, Plumer, Smith, Ochitill, Morrow & Bennett, supra note 18.
175. See J. KATz, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 193 (1984).
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and clinical intuition." 17 6 Iatrogenic effects may be reduced as a
result. Uncertainty about treatments may lead to fewer medical interventions, as informed patients decide to avoid treatment. This
seems to be contrary to the traditional interventionist approach to
uncertainty. As Katz observes, "The high rate of 'unnecessary' surgery, of resort to antibiotics and to tranquilizers, bears testimony to
physicians' propensity to resolve uncertainty and ambiguity by action rather than inaction." 17' 7 Cost reduction will also occur as the
result of effective informed consent. When interventions are
presented as optional rather than medically necessary, fewer interventions, and the concomitant fewer adverse side effects, will both
reduce costs.
V.

THE JUDICIAL LENS: FOCUSING ON THE INSTITUTION

The ethicist is concerned with the ethical binds in which the
individual doctor finds herself. The economist wants to reduce
wasteful consumption of scarce resources. The lawyer and judge
increasingly focus on the institution as the primary care giver, observing the coming of the corporation to health care. Recent decisions have noted the central role of the hospital in supplying goods,
in furnishing auxiliary services to staff doctors, in defining administrative rules, and in obtaining informed consent form signatures.
These services are charged to the patient directly and demonstrate
the expanding role of the institution in health care delivery.'
Physicians need hospital affiliation. By 1975, no doctor would consider
practicing without the resources of a hospital, and twenty-five percent of the 330,000 active physicians practiced fulltime in a hospital.' 7 9 It is estimated that almost eighty percent of the incidents
leading to malpractice claims originate in hospitals.'
The work setting has long been recognized by sociologists as a
powerful force in shaping individual attitudes, providing a context
in which "persistent and powerful demands cause the individual to
behave in a certain way regardless of his personal qualities."'' Institutional demands often work at cross purposes with the detection
of error, creating peer pressure dissuading a doctor from question176. Id. at 45.
177. Id. at 197.
178. See, e.g., Magana v. Elie, 108 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 439 N.E.2d 1319 (1982). See generally supra notes 104-23 and accompanying text.
179.

S.J. REISER, MEDICINE AND THE REIGN OF TECHNOLOGY 156 (1981).

180. Id. at 157.
181. E. FRIEDSON, supra note 9, at 94.
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ing his colleague's judgment or informing authorities of his errors.
The incentive structure can be changed, however, to improve the
detection of error and medical misadventure. Several no-fault proposals place the hospital as the central figure in a compensation system, coupling financial insurance incentives with risk disclosure. 82
These proposals recognize the importance of the health care institution in designing incentives and thereby regulating medical
practices.
The current cost constraints imposed by hospitals and other institutions on doctors through various incentive systems are one-dimensional; they ignore the costs of error and medical misadventure.
The tort system can be more than a mirror of practice with regard
to the institution. It can be a critical lens, focusing hospital attention on quality control.
Placing primary responsibility for medical error on the hospital
would inevitably help to reduce the incidence of iatrogenesis. If a
hospital faces liability directly or vicariously for the negligence of its
agents, it will tighten its control over their practice of medicine.
Starr observes, "Under corporate management, there is also likely
to be close scrutiny of mistakes, if only because of corporate liability
for malpractice." 18 Modern data collection technology provides
tools for monitoring medical practice, allowing the detection of unusual patient loss patterns, excessive surgery rates, or other costly
problems. As one hospital administrator has noted, "The large conglomerate can purchase and/or develop sophisticated quality-ofcare control programs managed by statisticians." 1' 84 This is probably too optimistic a managerial view, since clearly defined protocols
and ranges of treatment must be developed by the medical profession through research. If they are not, the quality control will be an
illusion, and a cruel one, for doctors.
Channeling liability through the institution recognizes that the
institution is in the best position to monitor iatrogenic effects. Expanded liability may therefore operate as one additional pressure
encouraging hospitals to keep better records, increase consultations,
allow time for doctor-patient conversation of an extended sort visu182. See Havighurst & Tancredi, "MfedicalAdversity Insurance': A No-FaultApproach to
Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 613 INS. L.J. 69 (1974); INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, BEYOND MALPRACTICE: COMPENSATION FOR MEDICAL INJURIES (1978); H.R.
5400, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. 2553 (1984) (the Moore-Gephardt Bill), proposing a hospital-oriented system in which disclosure of medical misadventure to patients is
required.
183. P. STARR, supra note 6, at 447.
184. Quoted in id.
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alized by Katz, and evaluate procedures in light of both input costs
and side effect costs. In one recent case, the Humana Corporation,
the first of the megacorps which are rapidly coming to dominate
health care delivery, was held liable for both compensatory and punitive damages to injured patients in one of its subsidiary hospitals.
The court found that Humana had total managerial and legal control over its subsidiaries but failed to hire competent and welltrained professional, administrative, and nursing staffs. It also
185
failed to regularly monitor or evaluate personnel.
The ethicist tends to look too narrowly at the dilemmas of
choice confronting the doctor. The economist and the sociologist
concentrate on the institutional setting in which the doctor operates; so should the lawyer and the judge. The institution should be
scrutinized by the lens of litigation. The hospital should save
money only after reassurance that diagnosis and treatment are minimally adequate. Cost as a defense by either doctor or institution
should be rejected. While these proposals may in the short run confront both doctors and hospitals with a cruel choice, they force consideration of the political issue of support for the poor and the
elderly. They also increase the incentives for scrutinizing medical
error and the iatrogenic costs of treatments. Cost must be seen as
encompassing not only the short-run tradeoff between reimbursement and expense, but also the long-run costs of mistakes and failures of introspection.

185. Olsen v. Humana, Inc., No. 107480, slip op. (Johnson City Dist. Ct., Kan., Nov. 7,
1984).

